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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays examining the relationship between im-
migrant political rhetoric and identity among Latinos in the United States. To achieve this
task, this study uses empirical evidence from a national survey and original data collected
from experiments in New York City and Los Angeles. The rst essay identies three forms of
Latino identity most relevant to political decision-making: national origin, pan-ethnic, and
American. I nd that levels of acculturation as dened by immigrant status and English
language strongly predict American identication. Latino identities inform support on im-
migrant issues. Latinos with higher perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic interests
are more pro-immigrant on issues pertaining to the rights of undocumented immigrants.
The second essay investigates how exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-
immigrant rhetoric shape the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups in New York
City. I test the eects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical political
appeals on candidate support. I nd that nationality-based appeals directly or indirectly tar-
geting Mexican immigrants do not activate identity in vote choice, only explicit, pan-ethnic
cues implicating all Latino immigrants activate \Latino" group interests in voting decisions.
The third essay tests whether political processes of collective identity observed among
non-Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Mexican and non-Mexicans in Border
States. Conversely, I nd that only nationality-based political appeals targeting Mexicans ac-
tivate Mexican group interests in vote choice. These results do not extend to non-Mexicans.
Anti-immigrant messages did not activate identity in voting. Overall, these ndings sug-
gest that identity activation in the context of threat may work dierently for Mexican and
non-Mexican Latino groups in the United States.
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vGlossary of Terms
Panethnicity: Jose Itzigsohn and Carlos Dore-Cabral (2000) provide the following
denition of panethnicity: \The expansion of ethnic group boundaries to include dierent
national or ethnic groups that share a common language, a common culture, or a common
regional origin into an encompassing identity."
National Origin: The U.S. Census denes national origin as the heritage, nationality
group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors.
Explicit Political Appeals: Anti-immigrant political rhetoric that use words such as
\Latino" or \Hispanic" to express negative sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory
statements, or to portray a threat from Latinos.
Implicit Political Appeals: Anti-immigrant rhetoric that express negative sentiments, makes
stereotypical or derogatory statements, or portrays a threat using more subtle references to
Latinos/Hispanics without using collective terms such Latino or Hispanic. For example,
phrases such as low-skilled immigrants are often used to dene Latinos implicitly
(Valentino et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).
Pan-ethnic Political Appeals: These type of political appeals use words such as \Latino" or
\Hispanic" to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory
statements, or to portray a threat from the collective group.
Nationality-Based Political Appeals: These appeals focus on the interests of a particular
national origin group to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or
derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the respective group.
Counter-Stereotypical Political Appeals: Such appeals express anti-immigrant sentiments on
a nationality-group less frequently stigmatized in American immigration debates such as
European or Canadian immigrants.
viIntroduction
The 2000 United States Census declared Latinos as the largest racial and ethnic minority
group in the United States. While questions still loom among academics and political pundits
as to whether such growth will lead to substantive political incorporation, we have observed
several examples in the past two decades of increased Latino political mobilization. Consider
California's electoral landscape between 1994 and 1998 with the enactment of Propositions
187 and 227. The campaign targeted undocumented immigrants by denying access to state
services and ending bilingual education programs (Nicholson 2005). While these initiatives
were pivotal in the re-election of California Governor Pete Wilson, they also increased Latino
voter participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Barreto
and Woods 2005; Nicholson, Bowler, and Segura 2006). Recall the series of immigration
marches across U.S cities in the spring of 2006. In the course of four months, an estimated
3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protested in the streets of over 160 U.S. cities against House Bill
4437, increasing penalties for undocumented immigrants (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and
Rim 2009). Again, in May of 2010, tens of thousands demonstrators chanted \shame, shame,
Arizona," carrying signs of \Todos somos Arizona" in protest against Arizona's toughest im-
migration law, SB 1070 (Preston, New York Times, May 1, 2010).
Early models of political participation emphasize resource-based explanations, such as
income and education, to explain why individuals are motivated to act while others are
not (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).
However, the unprecedented waves of Latino protests in 2006 and 2010 challenge theoretical
understandings of political mobilization among underrepresented racial and ethnic groups.
Despite low levels of income and education, young-age, and high levels of non-citizenship,
mass protests took place in U.S. cities, making links between immigration and political ac-
tivism, even among those with few resources, a highly salient issue on the nation's agenda.
The experiences of Latinos in the United States provide an excellent case of how inter-
1nal and external forces within and outside immigrant-based communities shape processes of
political incorporation. Of central importance in this dissertation is the salience of shared
ethnicity. While there is considerable disagreement as to whether ethnicity shapes Latino
political behavior, three patterns, often conicting, emerge within these debates (Garcia and
Arce 1988). First, patterns of social and political exclusion experienced by Latinos suggest
that ethnicity is and will continue to evolve as a central determinant in Latino political
behavior (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; L opez and Stanton-Salazar 2001; Portes and Rumbaut
2001; Mollenkopf et al. 2006; Jim enez 2009, 2010). Second, and highly contested, is the
possibility that the political salience of ethnicity can disappear across generations and over
time (Alba 1990; Dahl 1961). Models of European incorporation at the turn of the twenti-
eth century suggest that the salience of race and ethnicity declines with the birth of each
generation (Higham [1955] 1963; Roediger 1991; 2005; Jacobson 1998). Lastly, dierences in
national origin may challenge opportunities for collective mobilization. Heterogeneity across
Latino national origin groups as well as dierences in residential patterns - Puerto Ricans
and Dominicans in the Northeast, Cubans in the South Florida, and Mexicans in the West
and Southwest - divides the Latino social experience, contributing to distinct political dif-
ferences (DeSipio 1996, Segura and Rodrigues 2006).
This dissertation engages with each of these debates by investigating how Latinos across
dierent national origin groups and levels of acculturation negotiate competing national
origin, pan-ethnic, or American group identities and how these identities inform political
decision-making. In particular, I focus on three important research questions. One, how
do Latinos conceptualize their group and to what extent do national origin, pan-ethnic, or
American group attachments shape evaluations of immigrant issues? Two, does exposure
to explicit or implicit cues within anti-immigrant political rhetoric increase or decrease the
salience of ethnic group considerations in Latino vote choice? Three, do anti-immigrant
political messages resonate dierently for Mexicans versus non-Mexican Latino groups?
2Dening the Group
To understand processes of collective identity formation within Latino communities and
how they function in the political world, it is rst important to dene exactly what is meant
by terms Latino and collective identity. Many scholars and political activists reject the word
Latino since it neglects important historical, demographic, and cultural dierences that exist
across dierent groups of Latino national origin (Oboler 1995). Similar to Bedolla (2005), I
use Latino and Hispanic interchangeably to denote a socially constructed group in the United
States mainly dened by immigrants and their descendants from Latin America. Latino is
an ethnic category in the United States that encompasses individuals across dierent Latin
American heritages and cultures. Many can be of European, African, Asian, indigenous,
or of mixed race descent. Given such racial and ethnic heterogeneity, Latinos have many
options in how they identify and mobilize as a group (Masuoka 2008).
This dissertation emphasizes the ways in which Latinos are motivated to act or not on
behalf of the \collective." This does not assume that individuals possess only one form of iden-
tity, but rather various forms of identity such as race, ethnicity, class, or gender can become
salient depending upon context. More specically, I dene collective identities as "shifting,
situational, contextually driven understandings of self and place in particular historical mo-
ments" (Bedolla 2005, 7; See Padilla 1985). In decisions to mobilize, some identities may
become more salient than others. I argue that the political environment can determine when
and how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize collectively as \Latinos" or
as members within their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985). This research study
identies the political conditions under which pan-ethnic versus national origin identities
become relevant in short-term political decision-making among Mexican and non-Mexican
Latino groups. In particular, I focus on the relationship between perceptions of collective
identity and Immigrant political rhetoric. Variation in the strength of collective identity can
play an important role in how Latinos across dierent national origin groups and generations
3evaluate debates about immigration politics. Moreover, discourse from political elites about
immigration can play an important role in whether pan-ethnic or national origin identities
are activated in decisions to support a candidate.
Immigrant Political Rhetoric and Latino Identities
Three critical arguments frame this dissertation. First, I identify three forms of identity
that shape Latino socialization in the United States: national origin, pan-ethnic, and Amer-
ican. While social scientists argue that patterns of exclusion and racialization may increase
the salience of ethnicity, I posit that levels of acculturation as well as national origin can
strongly predict the strength of identication and consciousness along these three dimen-
sions. I also argue that these patterns of self-identication and levels of acculturation - as
dened by immigrant status or English prociency - have important implications for how
Latinos engage the political world. In particular, the ways in which Latinos dene themselves
will shape how they view their group's interests in regard to national immigration debates.
Second, I argue that elite discourse about immigration and/or immigrants in political
media inuences the type of cleavages formed among diverse groups of Latinos. Dierences
in group attachments across Latino national origin groups within particular geographies may
promote or minimize collective understandings of political interests in regard to immigrant-
related debates. Of central concern are dierences in group salience among Mexican and
non-Mexican Latino groups. Previous research focuses exclusively on the politics of Mex-
ican Americans, leaving unresolved questions about how identity is activated among non-
Mexicans in immigration debates. Much of this debates revolves around the interests of
Mexicans in the United States. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants
in elite immigration discourse, I posit that ethnic cues about Mexican immigration may not
be eective in mobilizing collective identity interests in the voting decisions of non-Mexican
groups. For group-mobilization to occur, non-Mexican groups must perceive a sense of soli-
4darity and unity within their own economic and political experiences. Elite framing is critical
to the mobilization of collective identities. These frames eectively identify the \injustice" or
benet of a policy or position to a particular social group (Polleta and Jasper 2001, 291). To
the extent to which anti-immigrant political messages focus on the interests of a particular
national origin group, non-Mexican groups may not rely upon collective identities in den-
ing their political preferences (Richeson and Craig 2011; see also White 2007). Thus, these
types of ethnic cues within immigration debates have the potential to disrupt group-based
politics. In sum, anti-immigrant rhetoric explicitly targeting Latinos collectively activates
Latino group interests in decisions not to support a candidate.
Third, pan-ethnic group interests may not be particularly accessible where a national
origin group is sucient in numbers to mobilize eectively on its own. This is particularly
the case for Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans residing in Border States. Be-
cause of ongoing immigration from Mexico coupled with shared experiences of exclusion in
a political context that often stigmatizes those of Mexican origin Mexican identity is highly
salient. Based on these experiences, I argue that nationality-based cues in which Mexicans
are explicitly targeted within anti-immigrant political rhetoric will activate Mexican group
interests in voting decisions.
This research oers both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of Latino
political incorporation. It takes into into account the uidity and complexity of Latino group
identity in the United States, forcing a re-evaluation of contemporary social scientic under-
standings of ethnic cues, intra-group conict, and assimilation. This dissertation challenges
conventional wisdom that all types of anti-immigrant threat resonate among Latino groups
by focusing on the conditions that may generate conict across ethnic groups of diverse
national origins. It also intervenes on current notions of assimilation by illustrating the
weaknesses in both European and racialized models of immigrant assimilation that exclude
Latinos across dierent national origin groups and generations. Empirically, this investi-
5gation uses both statistical and experimental methods to uncover the causal mechanisms
behind identity activation in reaction to anti-immigrant appeals documented in recent re-
search (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005;Barreto 2007). And it allows us to
address questions concerning similarities and dierences between Mexicans and non-Mexican
Latino immigrants in two dierent cities.
The Study
To achieve these goals, I examine the eect of elite political messages about immigration
on processes of collective identity formation among Latinos and how these identity choices
inuence decisions to vote for a political candidate. Central to this agenda has been the
collection of original experimental data to identify the causal mechanisms by which collec-
tive identities become salient or not in Latino voting decisions. I compare Latinos in New
York City and Los Angeles. New York City provides a diversity of Latino groups beyond
the Mexican American experience. In New York City, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans con-
stitute the largest Latino groups. In 2010, Puerto Ricans represented 30.8% of all Latinos,
followed by Dominicans at 25.3%, Ecuadorians (8.8%), and Colombians (4.4%). Mexicans
only constitute 14.3% of all Latinos in New York City. Los Angeles, on the other hand, is
largely concentrated by Latinos of Mexican origin. Mexicans constitute 79.3% of all His-
panics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area, followed by 7.2% of Salvadorans, and 4.3% of
Guatemalans (Pew Hispanic Center, 2009 American Community Center). Moreover, the im-
migration context within these two cities are dierent. Los Angeles is more often described
as a threatening context toward immigrants whereas New York City is dened as more wel-
coming response to immigrants. A comparison of Latinos within these two cities allows us to
assess how dierent environments aect processes of collective identity formation in voting.
I conducted a total of 582 surveys (of which 192 are used) in New York City during the
summer of 2010 and 1,000 (of which 401 are assessed) in Los Angeles during the summer of
62011. In New York City, I collected data from two community colleges: Bronx Community
College in the Bronx and La Guardia Community College in Queens. In Los Angeles, data
was collected from East Los Angeles Community College, West Valley Occupational Center,
Jeerson High, South Gate, and Evans Community Adult Schools. While a majority of my
respondents were 21 years of age, Latinos are generally a young population with a median
age of 27 (American Community Survey 2009, US Census Bureau).
Individuals completed a survey online and were randomized into 1 of 3 conditions in New
York City and 1 of 4 conditions in Los Angeles (with the addition of a control). The primary
goal was to uncover the eects of ethnic cues in mobilizing collective identities in a decision
not to support a candidate. I nd the experimental approach useful in its ability to allow
for causal inferences (Lacewell 2004). I organize the dissertation based on my main ndings
from experiments conducted in each city.
With all experiments, external validity is a concern. An important question that emerges
in this research study is whether Latinos in New York City are exposed to anti-immigrant
messages at similar rates as Latinos residing in Border States. Debates about immigration
and/or immigrants frequently occurs in Border States. These debates have largely been
framed around the interests of Mexican immigrants given increasing rates of undocumented
immigration over the past two decades. However, the series of immigration marches across
U.S. cities in the Spring of 2006 challenge issues of generalizability. The popularity of me-
dia outlets such as you-tube and facebook allow political messages to reach subsets of the
population beyond the intentions of candidates who seek to air them solely within particular
media markets. In the course of 4 short months in 2006, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million
protested in the streets of 160 U.S. cities (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and Rim 2009). The
vexing question becomes when are non-Mexican Latino groups and later generation descen-
dants motivated to act or not on behalf of the group in debates about immigration. This
dissertation oers insight that elite framing can play an important role in how dierent eth-
7nic groups within a social group develop collective understandings of their \group's" political
interests and when such framing can minimize the salience of collective identities in political
decision-making. In sum, elite framing around immigration can determine when and how
members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as \Latinos" or as members of their
respective national origin group (Padilla 1985).
Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation uses two methods of social scientic inquiry to investigate how dierent
Latino ethnic groups come to think of themselves or identify as members of the \collective"
and the implications this has on patterns of political decision-making. It begins with a sta-
tistical analysis of national survey data and follows with an analysis of experimental data
among non-Mexicans in New York City and Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in Los
Angeles.
Essay one oers both a theoretical and empirical exploration of the nuances of Latino
identities, the demographic and social processes that contribute to their development, and the
ways in which they function in the political world. Using the 2006 Latino National Survey,
this paper provides evidence for the existence of national origin, pan-ethnic, and American
identities within the Latino community and the specic ways they inform Latino political
support on immigrant and non-immigrant policy issues. This paper not only demonstrates
the contours of Latino identity, but it also provides an illustration of their distributions
among Latinos across dierent national origin groups and generations. I nd evidence that
levels of acculturation strongly predict American identication. I also nd dierences across
national origin groups in levels of pan-ethnic identication and consciousness. Dominicans
and Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic. I do not nd evidence of
pan-ethnic identication among Mexicans. The second part of this essay shows how these
dierent forms of Latino identity inform Latino support on immigration policy issues. Lati-
8nos with stronger perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic interests are more supportive
of pro-immigrant measures. However, this relationship is attenuated by levels of accultura-
tion such that more acculturated Latinos are less supportive of pro-immigrant issues.
While essay one shows discernable patterns in how Latino identify and how they evaluate
immigration policies, this empirical approach is hampered by issues of reverse causality. It
is incredibly dicult to determine whether Latino identities shape support for immigration
measures or whether exposure to debates around immigration activate Latino identities.
Moreover, we have suggestive evidence that non-Mexican Latino groups are more likely to
identify pan-ethnically than Mexican immigrants. Essay two engages the important ques-
tion of how exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-immigrant rhetoric shape the
voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups. Article two illustrates two ndings: one,
nationality-based cues focused on the interests on Mexicans do not activate Latino group
interests in vote choice. Two, only explicit, pan-ethnic cues successfully activate Latino
groups in a decision not to support a political candidate.
Essay three examines whether political processes of collective identity formation among
non-Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Latinos in Border States. While New
York provides an excellent test of how dierent non-Mexican Latino groups respond to ethnic
cues targeting Latino versus Mexican immigrants, the sample is not nationally representa-
tive of all U.S. Latinos. I nd that not all anti-immigrant political messages resonate among
Mexicans as they do for non-Mexican Latino groups. There are conditions upon which iden-
tity is activated. In contrast to non-Mexicans in New York City, pan-ethnic interests are
not activated by anti-immigrant appeals among Mexicans in Los Angeles. I nd evidence
that only nationality-based appeals focused on Mexican immigrants activate Mexican group
interests in decisions not to support a candidate. These eects, however, do not extend to
non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. Pan-immigrant and nationality-based appeals did not activate
collective group interests in candidate support. These ndings suggest that identity activa-
9tion may work dierently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context
of immigration threat.
The concluding chapter draws together the ndings from the statistical evidence and
experimental research into a coherent whole. It discusses the theoretical and empirical con-
tributions of this dissertation to studies of political psychology and Latino political behavior.
It also focuses on the sustainability of Latino identities over time and the implications col-
lective identities have on the politics of Latino incorporation in the US, particularly in the
upcoming presidential election of 2012.
10{ Essay One {
Dening Latino Identities and America's Immigration Debate:
Evidence from the 2006 Latino National Survey
\for nearly a century the more-or-less constant presence of large numbers of Mexican
immigrants in Mexican American communities has forced Mexican Americans to come to
daily decisions about who they are {politically, socially, and culturally { in comparison to
more recent immigrants from Mexico"
- David G. Guti errez, Walls and Mirrors, 1995
Abstract
Latinos have various options in how they identify and mobilize as a group. These
choices include national origin, pan-ethnic, or even American based identities. Despite
advances in understanding of how shared ethnicity shapes Latino political decision-
making, there are still a number of unresolved questions as to how Latinos concep-
tualize their group and how these forms of group identity shape political preferences.
I nd evidence that levels of acculturation and national origin strongly predict group
attachments. More acculturated Latinos are more likely to identify as American. I also
nd dierences in pan-ethnic identication based on national origin. Dominicans and
Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic than Mexicans. Latino
identities also inform support on immigrant policy. Latinos with stronger perceptions
of national origin and pan-ethnic interests are more supportive of pro-immigrant mea-
sures. However, this relationship is attenuated by levels of acculturation such that
more acculturated Latinos are less supportive of pro-immigrant issues.
Introduction
There is considerable debate in the eld of Latino politics as to whether collective group
interests inuence Latino political decision-making. Current research suggests that percep-
tions of shared ethnicity shape public opinion and participation. Three contextual factors
have been most important to the increasing salience of Latino identity in the United States:
(1) the growth of anti-immigrant initiatives in several states (2) the use of partisan campaign
media strategies in mobilizing Latino voters in presidential elections and (3) the presence
and growth of viable Latino candidates for oce in several states and congressional districts
(Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Se-
gura 2006; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006; Abrajano 2010).
11Conversely, other studies point to increased variation in the level of group-based solidar-
ity achieved among Latinos (Espiritu 1992; Tam 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). For
example, most work on pan-ethnic identity nd that Latinos strongly identify with their
national origin group as opposed to the pan-ethnic identier \Latino" (Jones-Correa and
Leal 1996). Heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups as well as geographic dier-
ences Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the Northeast, Cubans in the South Florida, and
Mexicans in the West and Southwest has divided the Latino social experience, contributing
to distinct political dierences. For instance, early studies from the Latino National Political
Survey (LNPS) show that Cubans are more solidly Republican than Puerto Ricans, Mexi-
cans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, or Dominicans who are solidly Democratic (de la Garza et
al. 1992).
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that levels of acculturation shape how Latinos
enter and engage in American politics. Theories of assimilation suggest that immigrant-
based groups \loosen" their ethnic attachments across generations (Dahl 1961; Alba and
Nee 2003). Conicting patterns emerge in evaluating patterns of assimilation among Lati-
nos. While some scholars point to the continuing salience of ethnicity, there is evidence
that processes of acculturation can mediate the eects of shared ethnicity in Latino political
decision-making (DeFrancesco and Soto 2006; Abrajano 2010).
Despite advances in our understanding as to whether ethnicity matters in Latino polit-
ical decision-making, there are a number of unresolved questions as to how Latinos dene
and/or conceptualize their group. To develop a better understanding concerning the role of
ethnicity in political decision-making, I focus on two important research questions: How do
Latinos across dierent national origin groups and levels of acculturation conceptualize their
group? And to what extent do Latinos rely upon perceptions of shared ethnicity in their
evaluations of immigrant related policy issues? Using national survey data from the 2006
Latino National Survey (LNS), this article provides initial evidence that variation exists in
12how Latinos identify based on national origin, panethnicity, or American group membership.
I also posit that dierences in group attachments along these three dimensions of identity
inform Latino support on immigrant and social policy issues.
This study also has important political implications for the future of Latino incorporation.
First, processes of racialization, experienced by U.S. Latinos across generations and U.S. ge-
ographies, may serve as a powerful catalyst for the creation and assertion of a valued, shared
identity in the U.S. political arena (Schmidt et al. 2000).1 The construction of pan-ethnic
identities may become more or less salient at given historical and political junctures depend-
ing on the nature of racialization (Omi and Winant 1994, Montejano 1987). Two, political
elites and activists play a formidable in promoting pethnicity to gain electoral advantage.
The U.S. political system rewards those groups with a strong, palpable presence and a set
of well-articulated interests (Browning, Tabb, and Marshall 2003; Schmidt 2000; McAdam
1999). The extent to which elected ocials and organizations can elicit these pan-ethnic
considerations on a national stage as African Americans do through common experiences
of language, religion or immigration, pan-ethnic unity may bring symbolic and material re-
wards for the political incorporation of Latinos as a group. 2 Thus, this research identies
the circumstances whereby pan-ethnic identities in relation to other salient identities can
become politically relevant or not in shaping Latino political preferences.
1Racialization refers to \the attribution of otherness by members of the dominant Anglo ethnic majority
in the United States, and the structural forces of domination, exclusion, and discrimination that have been
deployed to develop and act on this widespread attribution"(Schmidt et al. 2000, 565; also see Montejano
1987).
2It is important to note here that pan-ethnic sentiments are not always necessary to mobilize upon when
sucient numbers of a national origin are a majority. For example, we can look to Puerto Rican activism in
New York, Cubans in Miami, or Mexicans in Los Angeles. However, to extent that Latinos can exert power
on a national stage, it will be easier if these dierent subgroups saw themselves as a part of a larger identity
with common, shared interests (see Segura and Rodrigues 2006).
13Dening Latino Identities
This article concentrates on the role of collective identities in shaping Latino political
behavior. While there are several forms of identity such as gender, education, class, or oc-
cupation that can shape an individual's social identity, the goal is to establish how ethnic
identities are translated into American politics (Masuoka 2008). I primarily focus on three
important categories of group membership in Latino communities: national origin, paneth-
nicity, and American. National origin represents the principle category of group membership
for many Latinos. The U.S. Census denes national origin as the heritage, nationality group,
lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors. There is con-
siderable evidence that Latinos not only strongly identify with their national origin group,
but national origin identities strongly inuence political choices (de la Garza, DeSipio, Garca,
Garca and Falcon 1992; DeSipio 1996). For example, many Cubans in Florida identify with
the Republican Party.
Many scholars also posit that a more encompassing Latino identity exists within the
American context (Hero 1992; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Oboler 1995; Padilla 1985).
Once Latinos enter the United States, they are classied as Latino or Hispanic, creating the
basis for a shared ethnicity. Panethnicity refers to \the expansion of ethnic group bound-
aries to include dierent national or ethnic groups that share a common language, a common
culture, or a common regional origin in to an encompassing identity" (Itzigsohn and Dore-
Cabral 2000). There is considerable disagreement among scholars of Latino politics whether
panethnicity is politically relevant given the degree of heterogeneity across Latino national
origin groups and across generations (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Portes and Macleod
(1996) nd that the adoption of a panethnic identity is mediated by acculturation. Immi-
grants generally prefer the Mexican label whereas nearly half of the U.S. born generations
prefer Mexican American. However, by the fourth generation, a higher proportion of Latinos
consider themselves as only American (Telles and Ortiz 2008).
14There is mixed evidence as to whether Latinos identify with particular concepts of Amer-
ican identity. Social Dominance theory suggests that ethnic group and national attachments
are asymmetrical across dierent groups (Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius, Feshbach,
Levin, and Pratto 1997). In particular, these two identities are distinct or in conict for
minority groups. Socio-structural realities in American society can constrain the extent to
which Latinos identify with core features of national identity. The placement of groups
within an economically and racially stratied society accounts for variations in the intensity
of national attachments. Devos, Gavin, and Quintana (2010) shows that the exclusion of
Latinos within the dominant society is negatively related to the extent to which they identify
with the concept American (Devos, Gavin, Quintana 2010).
Latino Ethnicity and Assimilation
Scholars express divergent conclusions about whether Latino Americans are becoming
part of a \rainbow underclass" or assimilating in ways reminiscent of European immigrants
in previous decades (L opez and Stanton-Salazar 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Jim enez
2010). Prior research suggests that socio-structural conditions in employment and residential
life negatively shape the life chances of immigrants into later generations. For example, stud-
ies on intergenerational progress among Mexicans note increases in educational attainment
and wages from the rst to second generation but a attening of progress from the second to
the third generation. Poor educational opportunities over several generations accounts for
the slow assimilation trends within Latino communities (Telles and Ortiz 2008).
Herbert Gans dened these trends as \second generation decline" in which many non-
white immigrant children, situated in poor schools and jobs, experience downward assimila-
tion compared to their parents. Portes and Rimbaut illustrate a more complicated pattern of
segmented assimilation. Outcomes for the second generation are linked to the human capital
of the rst generation as well as how government incorporates immigrants. They nd that
15low human capital among parents along with hostile immigration policies reinforces strong
Mexican identities. At the same time, they nd that second generation immigrants are less
likely to speak Spanish, pointing to a a pattern of \Americanization."
Despite these trends, Portes and Rumbaut do not expect Mexicans to achieve full assim-
ilation in future generations. In fact, they emphasize the role of discrimination in dening
the Mexican American experience. More specically, a hostile context toward Mexican im-
migrants and their children not only promotes downward assimilation, but reinforces ethnic
boundaries. For example, Telles and Ortiz (2008) nd that the stigmatization of Mexican
origin immigrants and descendants, regardless of acculturation, creates \shared personal and
political identities," which serves as the primary basis for collective action (Telles and Ortiz
2008). Jim enez (2010) argues that on-going immigration into Border States increases the
relevance of national origin identities among Mexican immigrants into later generations. As
the largest minority group in the Southwest, persistent segregation and isolation reinforces
the salience of Mexican identication (Yancey, Erickson, and Juliani 1976). Telles and Ortiz
(2008) longitudinal study nds that isolation by virtue of residence in Los Angeles increased
national origin identication whereas those more proximate to non-Mexican Hispanics iden-
tied as Hispanic or Latino.
Conversely, there is increasing evidence that Latinos are assimilating in ways similar
to European immigrants in previous decades. Classical theories of assimilation predict a
steady loss of ethnic identication from immigrants to their children, disappearing by the
third generation. Social scientists disagree on measures of assimilation. Historical research
on European assimilation shows that the children of immigrants made substantial economic
and educational gains than their parents by the third generation. Scholars of assimilation
have sought to link these measures to the Latino experience, showing little variation in the
economic progress of Latino children and parents (Alba and Nee 2003). However, several
conicting patterns emerge when we examine non-economic measures such as language or
16ethnic identity. On cultural dimensions such as Spanish language retention, we nd some
evidence that Spanish uency gradually recedes over time (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Data from
Telles and Ortiz (2008) also illustrate that as Latinos move further away from the immigrant
experience they identify less in terms of national origin and increasingly as American. Third
generation descendants are three times likely to identify as American than rst generation
immigrants. These expectations lead to the following hypotheses on Latino identity choices:
National Origin Identication:
H2: Immigrants are more likely to identify with their national origin group than the
native-born
H1: Latinos of Mexican descent are more likely to identify on the basis of national
origin membership.
Pan-ethnic Identication:
H3: Latinos with greater perceptions of discrimination are more likely to identify as
Latino or Hispanic
American Identication:
H4: More acculturated Latinos are more likely to identify as American than less
acculturated Latinos.
Latino Identities and Immigration Attitudes
DeSipio (1996) argues that that \ethnicitiy will come to play less of a role in [Latino]
political decision-making than will other societal divisions" (DeSipio 1996, 8). Instead of
relying on ethnicity, Latino voters will base their decisions on more traditional predictors
of political participation. However, scholarship in Latino politics in the past decade has
challenged this empirical evidence, suggesting that ethnic voting persists among Latinos and
shapes political decision-making.
For example, empirical evidence suggests that discrimination plays a signicant role in
politicizing Latinos along ethnic-based lines in the United states (Barreto 2007; See also
17Sanchez 2006b). The ethnically charged immigration context found in Border States such
as California, Texas, and Arizona oers insight. During the 1990s in California, for exam-
ple, residents voted on statewide referendums to restrict public services to illegal immigrants
(Proposition 187 in 1994), end armative action (Proposition 209 in 1996), and end bilingual
education programs (Proposition 227 in 1998). All three passed with strong support from
White voters. Latino voters, majority of whom were of Mexican origin, strongly opposed all
three measures. For example, 63 percent of Whites to 23 and 24 percent of Latinos, respec-
tively, supported Propositions 187 and 227. These voting dierences suggest that Latinos
may be more likely to side with other Latinos on political issues that directly aect their
community (Barreto 2007). In sum, individuals who share a common identity with members
of a stigmatized group will rely upon shared group interests in opposition to policy measures
unjustly targeting their group.
There is considerable evidence that processes of acculturation can mediate support for
pro-immigration policies. Theories of assimilation predict a steady-loss of ethnic identica-
tion over time and across generations. Thus, \assimilated" individuals should instead inherit
the characteristics of the dominant, majority group (Subervi-Velez 1986). Both DeFrancesco
Soto and Merolla (2006) and Abrajano (2010) nd strong empirical evidence that accultur-
ated Latinos assimilate accessible information from the political environment dierently than
less acculturated Latinos. In examining the eects of Spanish-language political advertise-
ments on Latinos, they nd that ethnically targeted political ads have a weaker eect on
those following an assimilationist route to acculturation as measured by an individual's pro-
ciency in English. Thus,I expect the following:
H5: Latinos with high perceptions of shared national origin and/or pan-ethnic group
interests will more likely to support pro-immigrant policies.
H6: Latinos with higher levels of acculturation will be less supportive of pro-immigrant
policies.
18Data, Measures, and Method
To test this model I use data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). The LNS is
recognized for its size and scope; it contains a total of 8,634 Latino adults sampled in 16
states. Overall, 41% of interviews were conducted in Spanish and 59% in English. The survey
was conducted between November 17, 2005 and continued through August 4, 2006. The LNS
is the most ideal dataset to examine identity considerations among Latinos given its large
sample size across generations and national origins. The LNS contains 420 Cubans, 5,704
Mexicans, 822 Puerto Ricans, 335 Dominicans, 333 Central Americans, and 407 Salvadorans.
It is a unique national data source for this reason.
Measuring Latino Identities
The LNS includes an array of questions exploring collective group interests. Here I re-
strict my attention to Latinos' identication with their national origin group, the pan-ethnic
identier \Latino," and American identity. Both national origin and panethnic identities
are composed of four variables: group identication, linked fate, and perceptions of shared
economic and political commonality. The LNS only includes a measure of group identica-
tion for American identity. Thus, perceptions of American linked fate, shared economic and
political commonality with other Americans cannot be assessed using this survey. 3 Table
1.1 is a classication table that presents the survey questions used to measure each of the
three categories of Latino group identity.
Perceptions of national origin interests is assessed using four variables: national group
identication, linked fate, and perceptions of economic and political commonality of the
national origin group to other Latinos and Hispanics. To measure national origin group
identication, I use the following question: \how strongly do you think of yourself in terms
3I do include these variables in my own experimental survey in New York City and Los Angeles
19Table 1.1: Dimensions of Latino Group Identity
National Origin Pan-ethnic American
Group Identication How strongly or
not do you think of
youself as (national
origin descriptor)?
How strongly or not
do you think of your-
self as Hispanic or
Latino?
How strongly or
not do you think
of yourself as
American?
Linked Fate How much does
[national origin
descriptor] \doing
well" depend on
how other Hispan-
ics or Latinos are
doing well?
How much does
your \doing well"
depend on other
Latinos/Hispanics
also doing well?
Economic Commonality Thinking about
issues like job
opportunities,
education or in-
come, how much
do [national origin
descriptor] have
in common with
other Latinos or
Hispanics?
Thinking about is-
sues like job op-
portunities, educa-
tional attainment or
income, how much
do you have in com-
mon with other Lati-
nos or Hispanics?
Political Commonality Thinking about
things like gov-
ernment services
and employment,
political power
and representa-
tion, how muhc
do [national origin
descriptor] have
in common with
other Hispanics or
Latinos?
Now thinking about
things like govern-
ment services and
employment, politi-
cal power, and repre-
sentation, how much
do you have in com-
mon with other Lati-
nos/Hispanics?
of your national origin group." National group Linked fate measures the degree to which sub-
jects believe their national origin group's \doing well" depends on other Latinos or Hispanics.
20Lastly, economic and political commonality gauges the extent to which individuals believe
their own national origin shares common economic or political status with other Latinos or
Hispanics in this country. Each variable on the national origin group index is scaled from 1
to 4, with 4 indicating \Very Strong" or \A lot" of support for the preceding statements. 4
Similar questions are used to create an index for pan-ethnic identity. In terms of iden-
tication, respondents are asked how strongly they dene themselves in terms of Latino or
Hispanic. Linked fate measures the extent to which subjects believe their fate is linked to
that of all Latinos or Hispanics. I capture perceptions of economic and political commonality
by asking subjects whether they share common job or political opportunities (see Table 1.1)
with other Latinos and Hispanics in this country.
Unfortunately, the LNS does not include the same variables of linked fate, economic, or
political commonality for American group identity. In this case, I simply rely on a measure
of group identication; assessing how strongly Latinos identify themselves as American.
The Determinants of Latino Identities
To understand how Latinos choose to identify on the basis of national origin member-
ship, pan-ethnic aliation, or American group status, Figure 1.1 illustrates the percentage
of respondents who strongly identify or express a high degree of solidarity on each survey
question.5. About 64 and 65 percent of Latinos, respectively, identify in terms of their na-
tional origin group and as Latinos. However, only 41% very strongly identify as American.
Less than 50% of Latinos strongly perceive they share common job opportunities, in-
come, or education with their national origin group or with Latinos. For example, only 45%
very strongly agree they share common economic status with their national origin group.
4The LNS also includes a question of identication that ask subjects: \of the three previous terms, Latino
or Hispanic, national origin group, or American, which best describes you?" While not included in the index,
this variable is important, and I provide summary descriptors for this variable in Appendix A.
5Individuals who selected 4 on a scale from 1 to 4 are examined in Figure 1.1
21We observe these same patterns in pan-ethnic attitudes. For example, 38% perceive they
very strongly share job opportunities, income, and education with other Latinos or His-
panics in this country. Perceptions of political commonality are even lower, only 24% very
strongly agree they share issues of political power and representation with other Latinos and
Hispanics.
Figure 1.1: Percentage of Latinos Who \Very Strongly" Identify by National
Origin, Pan-ethnic, or American group Membership (by Survey Question)
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Figure 1.1 illustrates the percentage of Latinos who strongly identify along each identity consideration:
national origin, Latino, or American by survey question. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
22Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of each identity consideration index. The
National Origin index is composed of four questions. The range of this index is between 4
and 16, with 16 indicating a high degree national origin solidarity. The average score on
this index is 12.87. Similarly, the pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16. The average
score is 12.26. Since the LNS does not include comparable measures for American identity,
I illustrate the average score on perceptions of American identication among Latinos. The
average score on this American Identity measure is 3.03 on a scale from 1 to 4.
Table 1.2: Summary of Group Index Variables
Mean Median Range
National Origin Index 13.2 13 4 to 16
Pan-ethnic Index 12.26 12 4 to 16
American 3.03 3 1 to 4
Here I present the average, median, and range of index for national origin, pan-ethnic, and American
group identity. The National origin and pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16 since they are composed
of four survey questions all scaled from 1 to 4. The LNS dos not include comparable measures for American
group identity, so I rely upon on survey question of American identication. This is scaled from 1 to 4.
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Table 1.3 illustrates the average on each identity index by generational status and national
origin group. 6 We observe a downward trend in perceptions of ethnic group interests across
generations. First generation immigrants have a higher propensity, on average, to identify by
national origin group or as \Latino." This decreases signicantly by the fourth generation.
Conversely, we observe an upward trend in American identication by generational status.
Third and fourth generation Latinos are more likely to identify themselves as American. We
do not observe signicant dierences across national origin groups to identify by national
6I dene rst generation immigrants as those persons born outside the United States. I dene second im-
migrants as those born within the United States whose parents are born outside the United States. I included
those with both or one parent born outside the United States. Lastly, third generation immigrants are those
born within the United States and with parents born within the United States. However, grandparents are
born outside the United States.
23origin or panethnicity. However, both Cubans and Puerto Ricans have higher scores in
identifying as Americans compared to Mexicans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans.
Table 1.3: Mean Score of Group Index by Generational Status and National
Origin
National Origin Index Panethnic Index American N
First Generation 13.08 12.41 2.79 6184
Second Generation 12.63 11.98 3.56 1465
Third Generation 12.16 11.77 3.72 698
Fourth Generation 11.22 11.59 3.85 198
Mexicans 12.88 12.24 2.93 5704
Puerto Ricans 12.96 12.32 3.47 822
Cubans 12.79 12.11 3.41 420
Salvadorans 13.17 12.61 2.93 407
Dominicans 13.46 12.77 3.04 335
Here I present the average score for each identity index by generational status and national origin.
The National origin and pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16 since they are composed of four survey
questions all scaled from 1 to 4. The LNS dos not include comparable measures for American group identity,
so I rely upon on survey question of American identication. This is scaled from 1 to 4. Source: 2006 Latino
National Survey.
To predict an individual's likelihood to identify along each of these three forms of Latino
identity, I ran two OLS (national origin and pan-ethnic identities) and one ordered logit
(American identication) model using each index as the dependent variable. I control for
several demographic variables. These include education, income, age, gender, national ori-
gin group, acculturation, Catholic religion, perceptions of discrimination, and state context.
To measure acculturation, I control for immigrant status (foreign-born versus native-born),
length of residence within the United States 7, and survey language. 8
To assess perceptions of discrimination, respondents were asked four questions: 1) Have
7Length of Residence is re-coded as a binary variable such that those with US residence of at least 5
years or more are coded as 1. Those with less than 5 years residence are coded as 0. While 5 years seems
arbitrary, provisions under the The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in
1996 stipulates that legal permanent residents are eligible to apply for social welfare programs after 5 years.
8Survey language is coded as a binary variable such that those who conducted the survey or interview in
English are coded as a 1. Those who conducted the interview in Spanish are coded as 0.
24you ever been unfairly red or denied a job or promotion? 2) Have you ever been unfairly
treated by the police? 3) Have you ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neigh-
borhood (vecindario o barrio) because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a
house or apartment? 4) Have you ever been unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores? If
a respondent answered yes to any of these four questions, they were coded as 1 to indicate
perceptions of ethnic discrimination.
Similar to Masuoka (2008), the state context variable controls for respondent's living in
California. Given the history of anti-immigrant legislation during the mid-1990s with the
passage of ballot initiatives 187 (Denying undocumented immigrants access to social ser-
vices) and 227 (eliminating bilingual education), prior research illustrates that threatening
environments increase the salience of ethnicity (Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson,
and Segura 2006; Masuoka 2008). To control for these possible events, I control for Latinos
living in California.
Table 1.4 presents the determinants of Latino identity along dimensions of national ori-
gin, panethnicity, or American identity. Consistent with my hypothesis on factors predicting
an individual's attachment to national origin, I nd that immigrant status (born outside the
United States) is a signicant predictor of the strength of national origin identity. Immi-
grants are more likely to have higher perceptions of national origin identity than native-born
descendants.
I also predict that Mexicans, given their growth and experiences of racialization in the
United States, will have stronger perceptions of national origin identity than other national
origin groups (H2). For each model in Table 1.4, I estimated the strength of identity with
Puerto Ricans as the excluded category given their status as American citizens compared to
other Latino national origin groups. While Mexican origin is a signicant predictor of the
strength of one's national origin identity as compared to Puerto Ricans, this is not signi-
cantly dierent from other Latino national origin groups. Dominicans and Salvadorans are
25just as likely to have relatively strong perceptions of national origin identity as Mexicans.
I also nd that English language negatively predicts attachment with a national origin
identity. This provides support for hypothesis four that Spanish dominance decreases sup-
port for American identication. While model illustrates results for national origin interests,
I nd that the strength of national origin identity declines with prociency in English. We
also nd evidence that Latino respondent's living in California are also more likely to identify
in terms of their national origin group.
In terms of pan-ethnicity, I predict that perceptions of discrimination will increase pan-
ethnic groups interests (H3). Model two of Table 1.4 illustrates these results. I do not
nd any support for this hypothesis. The model, however, does reveal several trends in
pan-ethnic identication. I nd again that immigrant status and English prociency are sig-
nicant predictors of an individual's likelihood to identify as Latino or Hispanic. Immigrants
as compared to native-born Latino descendants are more likely to identify panethnically.9
Moreover, Spanish dominant individuals are more likely to identify pan-ethnically than En-
glish dominant Latinos. We also observe dierences between Mexican and non-Mexican
Latino groups in their likelihood to identify pan-ethnically. While we nd that most Latino
national origin groups with the exception of Cubans identify by national origin (model one),
model two illustrates that only Dominicans and Salvadorans are likely to have stronger at-
tachments to pan-ethnic group interests. Mexican ethnicity is not a signicant predictor of
pan-ethnic group consciousness.
Lastly, I investigate the impact of acculturation in predicting Latinos' decisions to iden-
tify as American. I hypothesize that acculturated Latinos will be more likely to identify
9Portes and Rumbaut 2001 show evidence of segmented assimilation by second generation immigrants.
Experiences with discrimination and low human capital drive second generation Latino immigrants on a
downward path of assimilation into a \rainbow underclass." Based on this logic, we might expect that
second generation Latinos will be more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic. In the appendix, I include
variations by generational status with those in the fourth generation as the excluded in the model predicting
pan-ethnic identity. However, I nd little evidence that second or third generation Latinos signicantly
identify as Latino/Hispanic.
26Table 1.4: Determinants of Latino Identities
National Origin Pan-ethnic American
Discrimination 0.01 -0.06 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Foreign-Born 0.42 *** 0.25 ** -1.31 ***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
English-Dominant -0.65 *** -0.67 *** 1.09 ***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Time in US 0.06 0.04 0.12
(0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Age -0.01 -0.01 *** 0.02 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.05 * 0.08 *** 0.08 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Family Income 0.01 -0.02 0.06 *
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Female 0.01 0.20 ** -0.38 **
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Catholic 0.16 0.33*** -0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Mexican 0.21 ** -0.01 -0.36 **
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Dominican 0.62 *** 0.36 * 0.02
(0.16) (0.17) (0.13)
Salvadoran 0.46 ** 0.34 * -0.10
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13)
Cuban 0.09 -0.13 0.23
(0.15) (0.16) (0.13)
California 0.18 0.08 0.07
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
Intercept 12.31 12.03
(0.19) (0.20)
1j2 -1.60
(0.16)
2j3 -0.42
(0.16)
3j4 1.09
(0.16)
N 5856 5934 6364
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey. Results are derived using OLS and ordered logit. Standard errors
are included in parenthesis. The excluded national origin category is Puerto Rican.
p < 0:05,   p < 0:01,   p < 0:001.
27as American. Model three of Table 1.4 illustrates these results. Native-born Latinos are
signicantly more likely to identify as American than immigrants. Moreover, English lan-
guage positively predicts Latinos' attachment to American identity. Also, Mexican origin is
negatively correlated with American identity, suggesting that Mexicans are signicantly less
likely to identify as American.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the probability of \very strong" American identication by levels
of acculturation as measured by immigrant status and language. Native-born Latinos have
a 63% likelihood of very strongly identifying as American whereas foreign-born immigrants
are only 33% likely to strongly identify as American, a 30 percent dierence. We observe
these same dierences between Spanish and English dominant Latinos. English speakers are
57% likely to very strongly identify as American compared to 32% among dominant Spanish
speakers.
In summary, the evidence presented above illustrates that Latino identities are not xed
categories. Acculturation plays a signicant role in predicting the strength of national origin,
pan-ethnic, and American identities among segments of the Latino population. The strength
of ethnic identity as presented in Table 1.4 follow assimilation patterns of identity erosion
between immigrants and native-born Latinos (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Immigrants are sig-
nicantly more likely to identify in terms of their national origin or as Latinos/Hispanics.
They are also signicantly less likely to identify as American as compared to native-born
Hispanics. Acculturation, as measured by English prociency, signicantly predicts identity
choices. The strength of American identication largely depended upon English language.
Those who conducted the survey in English were more likely to identify as American whereas
those who conducted the survey in Spanish were more likely to identify in terms of their na-
tional origin or Latino. Another interesting nding that emerges is across national origin
groups. I do not nd any evidence that Mexicans identify as Latino or Hispanic. Dominicans
and Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino/Hispanic with the exception of Cubans.
28Moreover, residence in California is strongly correlated with the strength of national origin
identity. Articles two and three investigate dierences in collective identities in New York
City and Los Angeles, CA between non-Mexicans and Mexicans in further detail using an
experiment.
Figure 1.2: Probability of \Very Strong" American Identication by Levels of
Acculturation
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Figure 1.2 illustrates the predicted probability of very strong American identication by acculturation
as measured by immigrant status and language, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
Latino Identities and Policy Support
I now consider the impact of Latino identities on support for immigrant versus non-
immigrant policies. The LNS also contains a battery of questions assessing support for
various policies. My dependent variables measure Latino support for immigrant versus non-
immigrant related policies. 10 I dene immigrant-dened policies as those pertaining to
10Appendix C includes all survey questions and question wording for the dependent variables described
here.
29immigration or the rights and/or privileges of immigrants within the United States. Within
the LNS, I include three measures for immigrant-based policies: opposition to tuition in-
creases for the undocumented at state colleges and universities (TUITION), support for the
immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants (IMMIGRATION), and opposition to
English immersion programs (IMMERSION). Respondents indicate the extent to which they
strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support various policy measures. Each item
is recoded to indicate pro-immigrant opinions. For example, strong opposition to tuition
increases or English immersion programs are recoded from 1 to 4.
I also compare support to non-immigrant policies. Respondents are asked whether they
strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support military intervention in IRAQ, gov-
ernment INCOME support, HEALTHCARE reform, and school VOUCHERS. Table 1.5
illustrates the average response to each policy measure. These preliminary results illustrate
that Hispanics support immigrant-dened issues. A large number of Latinos are strongly
opposed of tuition increases for undocumented immigrants at state colleges and universities.
They also support more lenient policies pertaining to undocumented immigration into the
United States. Many support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. On
the other hand, Latino support to replace bilingual education with English immersion is
relatively low with an average of 2.51.
In comparing these scores to non-immigrant related policies, we nd that Latinos signif-
icantly support government intervention on social policy issues. On a scale from 1 to 4, the
average respondent strongly supports government eorts to provide income support for those
who need it. These same pattern of results are seen in support for health-care reform. Many
believe the government should improve access and reduce costs within the US health-care
system. We nd relatively little support for military intervention in Iraq as well for school
vouchers. These trends may reect the partisan aliations of the Latinos within the LNS.
About 36% of Latinos within the LNS identied with the Democratic Party.
30Table 1.5: Average Response on Policy Measures
Average Response
Immigrant-Dened Policies
Tuition 3.36
Immersion 2.51
Immigration 3.23
Non-Immigrant Dened Policies
Keep troops in Iraq 1.98
Government Income Support 3.30
Healthcare Reform 3.47
School Vouchers 2.61
Table 1.5 presents the average score for each policy measure. Each variable is scaled from 1 to 4, with
4 indicating strong support for each of the policy measures. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
To understand how perceptions of shared ethnicity inuence support for immigrant ver-
sus non-immigrant dened social policies, I rely upon ordered logit regression. Each index
of collective identity - national origin, pan-ethnic, and American - is included in each model
as an independent variable. I also control for education, income, age, gender, Catholic re-
ligion, foreign-born status, national origin group, length of residence within the US, survey
language, California residence 11, and partisan identication.
Table 1.6 illustrates the results for Latino immigration attitudes. I predict that Latinos
with high perception of ethnic group interests - national origin and pan-ethnic - will be more
pro-immigrant on issues relating to the status and rights of the undocumented. This hypoth-
esis is conrmed in models predicting Latino opposition to tuition increases and support for
immediate legalization. Model one of Table 1.6 species opposition to tuition increases for
the undocumented. We observe that Latinos with high perceptions of both national origin
and pan-ethnic group interests are signicantly more likely to oppose policies that charge
undocumented immigrants higher tuition rates at state colleges and universities. Conversely,
those with higher levels of American identication are less likely to oppose tuition increases
11I control for California residence only within models predicting support for immigrant policies
31among the undocumented. Consistent with my hypotheses regarding the eects of accul-
turation (H6), I nd that native-born immigrants and English prociency predicted less
opposition to tuition increases for illegal immigrants at state colleges. Immigrants are more
likely than descendants to oppose higher tuition rates for the undocumented. Moreover,
English-dominant Latinos are less likely than Spanish-dominant Latinos to support charging
undocumented immigrants higher rates.
Table 1.6: Impact of Latino Identities on Immigrant Policies
Tuition Immersion Immigration
Latino Identities
National Origin 0.06 *** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.07 *** (0.01)
Pan-ethnic 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 ** (0.01)
American -0.15 *** (0.03) -0.11 ** (0.04) -0.12 *** (0.03)
Acculturation
Foreign-Born 0.21 *** (0.08) -0.27 ** (0.10) 0.50 *** (0.07)
English-Dominant -0.39 *** (0.08) -0.01 (0.10) -0.88 *** (0.07)
Time in US -0.06 (0.02) 0.01 (0.07) -0.11 (0.06)
Intercepts
1|2 -2.10 *** (0.27) -1.27 *** (0.34) -2.52 *** (0.26)
2|3 -1.33 *** (0.26) -0.04 (0.34) -1.03 *** (0.25)
3|4 0.03 (0.26) 1.11 *** (0.34) 1.00 *** (0.26)
N 5335 2611 5186
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender,
Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English prociency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan
identication (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.) See Appendix D for
an illustration of the full models
p < 0:05,   p < 0:01,   p < 0:001.
To assess the magnitude of these eects, I illustrate in Figure 1.3 the change in the
predicted probability between high and low national origin, pan-ethnic, and American group
identiers in strong opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented. I estimate these
eects for each identity consideration holding all other variables at their mean or modal
32values (female). The dierence between Latinos of high and low perceptions of national origin
group interests in predicting strong opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented is
15 percent. The dierence between high and low pan-ethnic identiers is 9 percent such that
Latinos with higher perceptions of pan-ethnic interests are 9 percent points more likely than
Latinos with lower perceptions to oppose tuition increases for illegal immigrants. Lastly,
the dierence between Latinos with high versus low levels of American identication is 10
percent. In this case, Latinos with higher levels of American identication were 10 percent
less likely to support this measure than those with lower levels of American identication.
Figure 1.3: Change in \Strong Opposition" to Tuition Increases for the Undoc-
umented between Low versus High Group Identiers
Identity Considerations
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Figure 1.3 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of strongly opposing tuition increases for
the undocumented between low and high national origin, panethnic, and American group identiers, holding
all other variables at their mean or modal values.
33I also assess the impact of acculturation on tuition increases for illegal immigrants. I
nd that immigrant status and English prociency are strong predictors of opinions on this
issue. The dierence between foreign-born and native-born Latino immigrants in strongly
opposition tuition increases is only 5 percent, suggesting that foreign-born immigrants are
only 5 percent more likely than native-born descendants to oppose tuition increases for the
undocumented at state colleges. Simlarly, the dierence between English and Spanish dom-
inant Latinos is 9 percent.
Model two demonstrates support for English immersion. 12 While I predict that na-
tional origin and pan-ethnic group interests should predict support for immigrant issues, I
only nd that American identication matters in predicting this relationship. However, the
results run in the opposition direction that my predictions. Latinos with higher levels of
American identication are less likely to support initiatives to replace bilingual instruction
in schools with English immersion programs.
Lastly, model three predicts support for immigration policies pertaining to undocumented
immigration. This dependent variable is re-scaled such that high scores indicate support
for the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. These ndings conrm both
hypotheses regarding the eects of identity and acculturation on support for immigration
policies. I nd that Latinos with greater perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic group
interests are signicantly more likely to support the immediate legalization of undocumented
immigrants. This relationship is reversed for those with higher levels of American identi-
cation; highly identied Americans are less likely to support open borders.
To assess the magnitude of these eects, I demonstrate in Figure 1.4 the change in the pre-
dicted probability of supporting the \immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants"
between high and low national origin, pan-ethnic, and American group identiers, holding all
12This variable is rescaled such that strong opposition is ranked higher on a scale from 1 to 4 to indicate
a pro-immigrant stance on the issue.
34other variables at their mean or modal values (female). Again, we nd comparable results as
Figure 1.3, predicting strong opposition to tuition increases for undocumented immigrants.
The dierence in the probability of supporting immediate legalization is 0.16 or 16% between
Latinos of low versus high perceptions of national origin group interests. Moving from low
to high perceptions of pan-ethnic considerations produces a change of only 8% in supporting
the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants. Moreover, there is a negative dierence
for Latinos with high levels of American identication. High American identiers are 7 per-
cent less likely to support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants than low
American identiers.
Figure 1.4: Change in Support for the Immediate Legalization of the Undocu-
mented between Low versus High Group Identiers
Identity Considerations
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Figure 1.4 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of supporting the immediate legalization of
undocumented immigrants between low and high national origin, panethnic, and American group identiers,
holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
35Consistent with my hypotheses regarding the eects of acculturation, foreign-born immi-
grants have a higher likelihood of supporting immediate legalization than the native-born.
Moreover, English-dominant individuals are signicantly less likely to prefer open border
policies. Holding all variables I their mean and modal values, I assess the impact of each mea-
sure of acculturation on support for the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants. Figure
1.5 illustrates these dierences. In terms of immigrant status, the native-born have a 34%
likelihood of supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants whereas
immigrants have a 44% probability on this same measure. We also observe dierences in
language. Spanish dominant Latinos have a 49% probability of supporting immediate le-
galization compared to 31% among English-dominant Latinos, a dierence of 18%. Given
that the 95% condence intervals overlap, we need to cautious over-stating the signicance
of these ndings. However, these results are suggestive of how acculturation shapes Latino
behavior. More acculturated Latinos have a lower probability of supporting open borders
than less acculturated Latinos.
In summary, the results illustrate a strong relationship between Latino identities and
support for pro-immigrant policy measures. We nd two pattern of results. First, while we
cannot illustrate causality, the results point to a strong relationship between Latino identities
and immigrant policies. Those with higher levels of national origin and pan-ethnic group
interests were more supportive of immigrant interests as related to the Dream Act and open
borders. Surprisingly, this relationship is not observed in maintaining bilingual education
programs. While Proposition 227 (eorts to end bilingual education) garnered opposition
from Latinos in 1998 in California, there may be a shift in the politics of language 14 years
later. Another possibility might be related to the question wording. The survey question
is framed around replacing bilingual education programs with English immersion programs
which does not sound as harsh as English-only laws. More research is necessary to uncover
these dierences in framing.
36Figure 1.5: Probability of Supporting the Immediate Legalization of Undocu-
mented Immigration, by Acculturation
Foreign−Born Native−Born
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Figure 1.5 illustrates the predicted probability of supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented
immigrants by acculturation (immigrant status and language), holding all other variables at their mean or
modal values.
Second, the results also illustrate some patterns of assimilation that are often neglected
in models predicting continued racialization within the Latino experience (Telles and Ortiz
2008). I rely upon three measures of acculturation: immigration status (foreign versus
native-born), English versus Spanish dominance, and time spent in the United States. In
each of these ordered logit models, immigration status and language are important predictors
of immigrant policy support. Immigrants are more likely to express strong support for these
policy measures than the native-born. Moreover, those with higher levels of acculturation as
measured by English language are signicantly less likely to support tuition increases for the
undocumented or policies securing the immediate legalization to undocumented immigrants.
These results on acculturation are in direct contrast to the ndings presented by Telles
and Ortiz (2008). On the question of whether the United States should have an open border
policy with Mexico, they nd that opinions did not vary among descendants as compared
37to their children. Nearly half of all immigrants (47 percent) agreed compared to 41 percent
among fourth generation Mexican Americans. Telles and Ortiz' (2008) relies on a sample of
households in Los Angeles County and the City of San Antonio. These two places are largely
Mexican. Telles and Ortiz' study is also hampered by selectivity issues given problems of
locating and interviewing respondents from the original survey in 1965. The benets of
the LNS is that it is a national survey of Latinos throughout the United States based on
random-digit dialing. These dierences in results might be explained by sampling issues
inherent within the design of these two surveys.
Measuring Support for non-Immigrant Policies
Another test to evaluate the strength of this relationship between Latino identities and
immigrant policy attitudes is to assess the role of collective identities in other social policy
domains. Do Latinos rely upon identity in their decisions regarding non-ethnic issues? In
this next section, I estimate the eect of Latino identity considerations on support for four
non-immigrant policy measures in the LNS: support to keep troops in Iraq, government
income support, healthcare reform, and school vouchers. Table 1.7 presents coecients and
standard errors for ordered logit models predicting support for each of these measures.
Model one of Table 1.7 estimates support to keep U.S. troops in Iraq in order to stabilize
Iraq's government. I do not nd any support that national origin or pan-ethnic group
considerations inuence support for continued U.S. intervention in Iraq. On the other hand,
American identication signicantly inuences strong support for continued intervention to
stabilize the government of Iraq. Those with higher levels of American identication were
signicantly more likely to support U.S. troops in Iraq. Moreover, the coecient for English-
dominant Latinos is signicant and positive, suggesting that English prociency is positively
correlated with support to keep U.S. troops in Iraq.
Model two examines support for government income support to the poor. Here, we ob-
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39serve that pan-ethnic group interests matter in predicting Latino support for government
income support. Individuals with higher perceptions of pan-ethnic considerations are more
likely to support social welfare policies that provide income support to those who need it.
Conversely, acculturation as measured by language negatively predicts government income
support. English dominant Latinos are less likely to support redistributive policies. How-
ever, the dierence between Spanish and English-dominant individuals is only 5 percent in
predicting strong support for government income assistance to the poor.
Model three predicts Latino support for healthcare reform. Similarly, we nd that a pos-
itive relationship exists between Latino identity considerations and support for government
intervention to improve access and reduce costs. Latinos with higher perceptions of ethnic
group interests as dened national origin or panethnicity are signicantly more likely to
support healthcare reform. Acculturation is also negatively correlated with strong support
for healthcare reform. English-dominant Latinos are less likely to support government inter-
vention on issues relating to access and quality within the U.S. healthcare system. In terms
of language, I only nd a dierence of 8 percent between Spanish and English-dominant
individuals in support for government intervention to improve the healthcare system.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the impact of national origin and pan-ethnic considerations on those
who \strongly support" government income support for the needy and government interven-
tion in improving the U.S. healthcare system. Here I illustrate the change in probability in
strong support for these two policy measures between low versus high ethnic group identi-
ers, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The dierence in strongly supporting
income support between Latinos with low verus high national origin considerations is only
8 percent. This dierence is twice as large among pan-ethnic identiers. Among low and
high pan-ethnic identiers the dierence is 16 percent in the likelihood of strongly support
government income support. In other words, high pan-ethnic identiers are more likely to
support income support for the needy. We nd these same pattern of eects in predicting
40strong support for health care reform. Latinos with greater perceptions of national origin
consciousness are 8 percent more likely than those with less to strongly support government
improvement in the U.S. healthcare system. Similarly, we observe a 13 percent dierence
between low and high pan-ethnic identiers on this same measure.
Lastly, model four illustrates coecients and standard errors for Latino support on school
vouchers. Here I do not nd any correlation between collective group interests and support
for school vouchers. National origin, pan-ethnic, or American group interests do not predict
support for school vouchers. The only signicant variable in this model is language. English
dominant individuals are signicantly less likely to support school vouchers.
Figure 1.6: Change in \Strong Support" for Government Income Support and
Healthcare Reform between low and High Ethnic Group Identiers
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Figure 1.6 illustrates the change in the probability of strongly supporting government income support
for the \needy" and government improvement in the US health care system between low and high ethnic
group identiers, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.
41Discussion and Conclusion
In 2006 and 2010, Latinos challenged their status as the "sleeping giant" of American
politics. Despite high levels of non-citizenship, low levels of education and income, mass
protests took place across U.S. cities. For many who study public opinion and political
behavior, an important question is why some individuals are motivated to participate while
others are not (Bedolla 2005). For many excluded racial and ethnic minority groups, collec-
tive identity is an important variable to this equation.
In this paper, I have focused on three primary forms of Latino group identity: national
origin, pan-ethnic, and American. While prior literature points to the persistence of ethnic-
ity across generations, I nd some evidence of identity erosion across levels of acculturation
(Telles and Ortiz 2008). More acculturated Latinos are less likely to identify in terms of
their national origin or pan-ethnic group and are more likely to identify as American. We
also observe dierences by national origin in the likelihood to identify as Latino or Hispanic.
Non-Mexican Latino groups such as Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to iden-
tify pan-ethnically whereas we do not nd the pan-ethnic identier salient among Mexicans.
Moreover, Mexicans are less likely to identify as American.
The ndings presented also indicate that Latino identities are relevant to political at-
titudes. Within the domain of immigration politics, I nd that both national origin and
pan-ethnic identities are strongly correlated with strong opposition to tuition increases for
the undocumented as well as support for the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants.
Ethnic identity considerations also extend to attitudes regarding social welfare policies. Lati-
nos with higher perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic group interests have a higher
propensity to support income support for the needy and government intervention to improve
our nation's healthcare system. However, these relationships are attenuated by levels of
acculturation. More acculturated Latinos, as dened by native-born or dominant-English
speakers, were less likely to support immigrant inclusion or social welfare policies.
42The issue of immigration has and will continue to play a central motivating role in Latino
politics. The nature and rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric within political media, the increase in
partisan campaign strategies targeting Latinos, and the frequent usage of the term \Latino"
or \Hispanic" all contribute to the construction of pan-ethnic group attachments among U.S.
Latinos across a diversity of national origins. While DeSipio (1996) argued that \ethnicity
will come to play less of a role in [Latinos] political decision-making than will other societal
divisions," I nd that Latinos do rely upon ethnic group attachments in constructing their
views on immigrant policy.
What explains the salience of identity in social welfare policies? While the results are sug-
gestive, they show a relationship between identity and politics. In the past decade, various
political debates have linked Latino identity with social policy issues. At dierent political
junctures, the interests of immigrants and their descendants have been tied to discussions
about welfare and even healthcare. For example, the issue of governmental income support
is a politically salient issue within the Latino community. Immigrant access to state services
was contentious in the 1990s. The 1996 welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, barred legal immigrants who entered the country af-
ter August 22, 1996 from receiving means-tested, federally funded assistance. This included
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income,
and Food Stamps. Moreover, immigrants living in the county as of that date were barred
altogether from Food Stamps and SSI programs until they became citizens. These policy
debates regarding immigrant access to state services were most pertinent in California. In
1994, California voters supported proposition 187, which sought to deny state services to
undocumented immigrants. Many Latinos perceived these policies as threatening to Latino
interests. As a response, we observe increased rates naturalization and voting among newly
naturalized citizens throughout the state of California (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001;
Barreto and Woods 2005).
43American healthcare debates have also been framed around the politics of immigrant
exclusion. In debates about access to health services, undocumented immigrants are of-
ten often criticized for the rise in uncompensated healthcare costs. In September of 1993
and again in 2008, both President Clinton and Obama excluded undocumented immigrants
within their proposals to reform the healthcare system. Many Latino groups and organiza-
tions place issues of healthcare reform as top priority in their eorts to mobilize the Latino
community. Issues of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease are important issues within the
Latino community. Thus, ethnic group considerations may provide an important lens as to
how many Latino individuals evaluate policies involving healthcare access and quality.
Issues of Reverse Causality
Overall, this research provides a explanatory lens to future research. Will group identities
persist over time? If we observe suggestive patterns of identity erosion and \assimilation,"
what implications exist for the future incorporation of Latinos as a group? While this cross-
sectional survey oers a foundation for studying the relationship between Latino identities
and politics, longitudinal data is needed to determine whether Latino identities will per-
sist over time in determining how Latinos enter and engage in politics. Moreover, issues of
causality and post-treatment bias are a concern. This empirical approach does not demon-
strate a causal relationship between Latino identities and immigrant attitudes. We do not
know with certainty whether shared ethnicity increases support for immigration policies or
whether exposure to immigration policies activate collective group interests.
Moving Forward
The ndings from essay one point to important dierences in the nature of national origin
and pan-ethnic identication among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. While most
44Latino groups identify in terms of national origin with the exception of Cubans, there are
dierences in the extent to which many identify as Latino or Hispanic. Whereas Dominicans
and Salvadorans are more likely to identify pan-ethnically, Mexicans do not. The next two
essays make progress toward the goal of better understanding these dierences across Latino
groups and the causal mechanisms under which perceptions of collective group interests are
activated in political decision-making. I conduct two experiments estimating the eects of
immigrant political rhetoric on the salience of Latino identities among non-Mexicans and
Mexicans in two cities { New York City and Los Angeles.
45{ Essay Two {
Activating \Latino" Identity:
Ethnic Cues, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, and the Response of
Non-Mexican Latino Groups
\While we all may speak a version of our Spanish colonizer's language, contrary to popular
belief, we're not all Mexican. Yes, the majority of Latinos in America are of Mexican
descent, but we also hail from other countries around the world."
- Raquel Cepeda, `But what's a Latino?', CNN, October 22, 2009
Abstract
This paper engages with the important question of how exposure to explicit and im-
plicit cues within anti-immigrant political messages shape the voting decisions of non-
Mexican Latino groups. I argue that explanations on the salience of shared ethnicity in
Latino voting behavior focus exclusively on the experiences of Mexican Americans, rais-
ing the issue of generalizability to other Latino national origin groups. In a laboratory
experiment, I test the eects of explicit and implicit pan-ethnic and nationality-based
cues on Latino candidate support. The results illustrate signicant dierences in the
activation of identity among non-Mexican Latino groups in response to immigration
debates. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants in elite immigra-
tion discourse, nationality-based cues about Mexican immigration are not eective in
mobilizing collective identity in the voting decisions of non-Mexican groups. I nd that
only explicit cues to Latino identity successfully activate Latino group interests in a
decision not to vote for a political candidate. These ndings not only suggest that
identity activation works dierently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans
in the context of immigration threat, but they also challenge the notion of a \one size
ts all" political strategy in Latino political mobilization.
Introduction
There is considerable evidence that threatening political environments mobilize immi-
grants to naturalize, protest, and even vote in terms of larger, collective group interests
(Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and
Segura 2006). Consider California's electoral landscape between 1994 and 1998 with the
enactment of propositions 187 and 227. The campaign targeted undocumented immigrants
by denying access to state services and ending bilingual education programs. While these
46initiatives were pivotal in the re-election of Republican Governor Pete Wilson, they also in-
creased Latino voter participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura
2003; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006). Recall the series of
immigration marches across U.S cities in the spring of 2006 and 2010. In the course of four
months, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protested in the streets of over 160 U.S. cities
against increased penalties for undocumented immigrants (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and
Rim 2009).
Largely overlooked in the discussion of shared ethnicity is how political messages about
immigration increase or decrease the salience of identity among non-Mexican Latino groups.
Much of previous research focuses on the political experiences of Mexican immigrants and
Mexican Americans (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler,
Nicholson, and Segura 2006). While Mexicans have become the largest immigrant and minor-
ity group in the United States, we know considerably less as to whether processes of collective
identity formation among Mexicans are generalizable to other Latino national origin groups.
Does shared ethnicity inuence how Latinos, regardless of national origin membership, en-
gage in politics, or is it necessary for issues to be dened in pan-ethnic terms to mobilize
all Latinos collectively? Given shared experiences of immigration and racialization in the
United States, most research shows that all anti-immigrant political messages resonate across
Latino national origin groups (Barreto 2007; Telles and Oritz 2008). However, little quan-
titative research validates this claim. Heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups as
well as dierences in residential patterns - Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the Northeast,
Cubans in South Florida, and Mexicans in the West and Southwest - has divided the Latino
experience, contributing to distinctive social and political dierences (Segura and Rodrigues
2006; Garc a Bedolla 2005).
While the immigration experience - moving from one's homeland to the U.S. - is certainly
shared across groups, the circumstances of immigration are quite dierent. Puerto Ricans
47began their migration to the U.S. as American citizens. Cubans were mostly given refugee
status in the 1960s. Between 1962 and 1979, thousands entered the US under the Attorney
General's parole authority. Other groups such as Salvadorans and Guatemalans have similar
experiences as Mexican labor migrants, however their immigration to the U.S. is recent and
relatively smaller (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Dominicans entered the United States as lower-
wage manual workers after 1965 yet many often experience racialization as blacks (Itzigsohn
and Dore-Cabral 2000).
With these considerations in mind, I examine the degree to which exposure to explicit
and implicit cues within anti-immigrant rhetoric increase or decrease the salience of col-
lective identities in Latino vote choice among non-Mexican Latino groups. I argue that
the activation of Latino group identity cannot be presumed to be automatic or equal for
non-Mexican Latino groups as they are for Mexicans in contexts of American immigration
discourse. To evaluate the political decisions of non-Mexicans, I consider two types of po-
litical contexts that shape Latino vote choice: (1) explicit-and-implicit immigrant rhetoric
and (2) pan-ethnic versus nationality-based political appeals. Given the repeated associa-
tion of visual and verbal cues implicating Mexican immigrants in debates about immigration
and immigrants, nationality-based cues about Mexican immigration may not be particularly
eective in mobilizing non-Mexican groups along collective lines. In a laboratory experi-
ment in New York City, I nd that exposure to explicit and implicit cues focused around the
interests of Mexicans do not activate Latino group interests in vote choice; only explicit, pan-
ethnic appeals increase Latino group interests. The empirical results from this study have
broader implications on the future incorporation of Latinos across national origin groups in
the United States. The ndings not only suggest that collective identity activation may work
dierently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration
threat, but they also challenge the notion of a \one size ts all" political strategy in Latino
mobilization.
48Contexts of Threat Reconsidered
Political scientists have identied three contextual factors most important in mobilizing
shared ethnicity in Latino voting: (1) the growth of anti-immigrant initiatives in several
states (2) the use of partisan campaign media strategies in mobilizing Latino voters in pres-
idential elections and (3) the presence and growth of viable Latino candidates for oce
(Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Se-
gura 2006; Defrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006; Abrajano 2010). Despite advances in our
understanding within this theoretical framework, we have not produced conceptual and em-
pirical clarity about the political conditions under which perceptions of shared ethnicity
should or should not matter in Latino political decision-making.
Social identity theory (SIT) provides a useful framework to understand group-based be-
havior in American politics. Group behavior is dependent upon the extent to which dierent
groups come to think of themselves or identify as members of the collective (Tajfel 1981;
Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1982). Threat plays a signicant role in the construction
of social identities. For example, previous research shows that experiences with discrimina-
tion motivate later generation Mexican Americans to identify with the experiences of their
immigrant co-ethnics, increasing the salience of Mexican identity (Keefe and Padilla 1987;
Padilla and Perez 2003; Jim enez 2010). However, social scientists have paid little atten-
tion to dierences between non-Mexicans and Mexicans in response to immigration political
appeals. Telles and Ortiz (2008) argue that other Latino groups are \perceived, labeled,
and treated as Mexicans" (Telles and Ortiz 2008, 12). In their view, the historical stigma
that is most generally attached onto Mexicans is generally inscribed onto other persons from
Latin America. Based on this logic, all anti-immigrant appeals, regardless of whether they
target the collective group or Mexicans, should mobilize shared ethnicity in Latino political
mobilization. Yet, it is less clear whether this can be generalized beyond contexts where
non-Mexican groups are not frequent or direct targets of anti-immigrant political appeals.
49The preceding discussion highlights the need for a conceptual framework that takes into
account the responses of non-Mexican Latino groups to anti-immigrant political appeals.
Given the very dierent historical and contemporary experiences of dierent Latino groups,
the activation of collective group interests cannot be assumed to be automatic by all types
of immigration appeals in the political environment. There are conditions by which these
identities can become salient or not in political decision-making.
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) identify three types of threat that can presumably
reduce perceptions of common identity. I focus on two that are likely to aect perceptions
of intragroup conict in the discussion of racial and ethnic politics. 13 Categorization threat
occurs when individuals perceive that out-group members are imposing a negative category
label upon them that is likely to result in dierential treatment. This is mostly associated
with high status minority group members such as auent Latino and Caribbean blacks
who due to high income and status may identify more with non-Hispanic whites than their
own group (Richeson and Craig 2011). Moreover, Garc a Bedolla (2005) nds evidence of
categorization threat among acculturated Latinos in Los Angeles. Interviews with East Los
Angeles respondents, a working class Latino area, reveals that many were against proposition
187 because of its anti-Mexican sentiments. Respondents in Montebello, a predominantly
middle class suburb of Los Angeles, expressed more ambivalence. While more than 80 per-
cent of East Los Angeles respondents cited their identication with immigrants as reason for
their opposition against Proposition 187, only 30 percent of Montebello respondents cited
this same reason. Distinctiveness threat occurs when group members perceive that a par-
ticular category is too large of a numerical majority to provide a substantive benet for
self-identication (Richeson and Craig 2011). For example, some individuals may perceive
that the panethnic label \Latino" or \Hispanic" undermines the distinctiveness of their own
13Branscombe and her colleagues also point to processes of value threat. Value threat stems largely from
an individual's view that their own group is perceived more negatively compared to other groups. However,
the predicted eects on collective identity are less clear (Richeson and Craig 2011).
50national origin group. The consequence is dis-identication from the in-group.
Building from research in social psychology and racial politics, I argue that the political
salience of shared ethnicity can wax or wane according to political messages in the environ-
ment. Elite discourse about immigration and/or immigrants in political media can foster or
minimize collective mobilization among Latinos across dierent national origins. For group-
based mobilization to occur, Latinos must perceive a sense of solidarity and unity within
their own economic and political experiences. Elite framing is critical to the mobilization of
collective identities. Successful frames not only identify the \injustice" or benet of a policy
or position to a particular social group, but they identify the \identities of the contenders,
distinguishing `us' from `them'" (Polleta and Jasper 2001, 291). However, dierences in
the salience of group attachments across Latino national origin groups can moderate the
impact of a frame, creating divisions in how Latinos come to understand their collective
interests within immigration and/or immigrant related debates. To the extent to which
anti-immigrant political messages focus on the interests of a particular national origin group
dierent from an individual's national origin, non-Mexican groups may not rely upon col-
lective identities in dening their political preferences (Richeson and Craig 2011; see also
White 2007). In sum, such cues within immigration debates have the potential to disrupt
group-based politics.
Research Hypotheses
I consider two types of political contexts that are likely to promote or disrupt ethnic
boundaries in Latino vote choice: (1) explicit-and-implicit political rhetoric and (2) pan-
ethnic and nationality-based political appeals. I argue that pan-ethnic appeals, those focus-
ing on the interests of the collective group, will be most eective in priming Latino group
interests in candidate support. In response to an explicit or implicit pan-immigrant cue,
Latinos will increase their reliance upon Latino group considerations in their evaluation of
51candidates. I dene explicit, pan-ethnic cues within anti-immigrant political rhetoric as mes-
sages that use words such as \Latino" or \Hispanic" to express anti-immigrant sentiment, to
make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from Latinos. Implicit,
pan-ethnic appeals convey the same messages as explicit messages, but they replace these
words with more subtle references to Latinos without using collective terms such Latino
or Hispanic. For example, phrases such as low-skilled immigrants are often used to dene
Latinos implicitly (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Both
explicit and implicit pan-ethnic cues will activate Latino group considerations since they
dene a collective interest aecting all Latinos within the issue of immigration. Thus, I
hypothesize:
H1: Non-Mexican Latino groups will be less likely to support a candidate when exposed
to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant political appeals.
H1A: Non-Mexican Latino groups with higher perceptions of Latino group interests
will be less likely to support a candidate under exposure to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant
political appeals
Nationality-based appeals, in this case, focused around the interests of Mexican immi-
grants may not be as eective in activating pan-ethnic group thinking in vote choice among
non-Mexican groups given their distance from localized immigration debates. The repeated
association of visual and verbal cues in news media that focus on undocumented Mexican
immigration may be grounds for the dismissal of Mexican-based cues among Dominicans,
Puerto Ricans, Colombians, or Ecuadorians. While these groups are connected through
shared experiences of immigration, the marginalization of Mexicans by illegal immigration
in the public mind increases the salience of intragroup dierences. To the extent that immi-
gration cues center on the interests of Mexican immigrants, such messages may not increase
collective group interests in Latino candidate support (see White 2007 on African Ameri-
cans). This lead to the following expectation:
52H2: Non-Mexicans' preference not to vote for a candidate promoting explicit or implicit
nationality-based appeals will not be a (direct) function of Latino group interests.
Counter-stereotypical appeals are likely to have minimal eects on panethnic considera-
tions. These appeals counter stereotypes related to immigration by portraying groups that
are typically discussed in debates about high-skilled immigration. Canadians and European
immigrants are mostly dened within these debates in eorts to protect American workers
against high-skilled immigration (Hochschild and Cropper 2010). This model is conceptually
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
H3: Absent a cue to Latino ethnicity, non-Mexicans should use traditional indicators such
as partisanship in their evaluation of candidates when exposed to counter-stereotypical
appeals (anti-Canadian cue)
Methods and Procedures
To examine how key aspects of elite discourse about immigration mobilize or de-mobilize
collective identities in candidate support, I rely upon an experimental design. I embed an
audio news clip from National Public Radio (NPR) within a web-based survey.14 I manu-
factured these audio clips to appear as embedded you-tube clips from NPR. Upon arriving
for the study, participants were asked whether they prefer to complete the survey in Span-
ish or English and are randomized into one of ve treatment conditions. I rely upon a
post-test only design to avoid contamination of the treatment by pre-test measurement (Mc-
Connaughy, White, Leal, Casellas, 2010). The primary goal is to avoid questions that may
prime identity before the experimental cue is given. Thus, all measures except for basic
demographic questions are asked after subjects are exposed to the treatment.
Subjects are told that I want their reactions to a news story recently featured on NPR.
Participants then listen to a two-minute mock news report about a Congressional Repre-
14I rely on software from Qualtrics to design my web-based survey.
53Figure 2.1: Activating Collective Group Interests in Candidate Support
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Conceptual framing of how exposure to pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical messages
about immigration activate Latino group interests in decreased candidate support
sentative named Nicholas Wilson running for oce in California. To prevent pretreatment
eects, I designed an audio clip similar to online clips from NPR. Utilizing the services of
Voice 123.com, one bilingual voice actor performed the news scripts in English and Spanish.
Figure 2.2 provides an example of the web-based platform featured in the experiment.
54Figure 2.2: Web-Based Version of Audio Clip: Anti Pan-ethnic Frame
AROUND THE NATION
Decreasing Latino Immigration 
Top Priority For Representative
Morning Edition
May 21, 2010 | More on NPR.org
Representative Nicholas Wilson’s campaign places Latino 
immigration as top issue in congressional election
The news anchor details Representative Nicholas Wilson's view regarding the conse-
quences of immigration without reference to the candidate's political party aliation. All
messages feature the same identical argument emphasizing the potential costs of increased
immigration, which include driving down wages and increasing competition with American
workers. What changes across conditions is the group discussed by the congressional repre-
sentative. The representative stresses the need to tighten our current immigration laws with
each anti-immigrant condition. Each of these frames directly or indirectly targets Latinos,
Mexicans, or Canadian immigrants.
Table 2.1 provides a brief description of the experimental treatments used in this study.
The explicit, pan-ethnic frame emphasizes the potential costs of increased Latino immigra-
tion. Opposition to immigration is linked to the threat of immigrants from all Latin American
countries. Given increased media attention on issues of border control and national security,
explicit nationality-based appeals are expressed through the lens of Mexican immigration.
Instead of linking all Latinos to problems of immigration, Mexican immigrants are explicitly
dened.
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56Implicit messages employ subtle references to Latinos as a cohesive group or Mexicans.
The implicit, pan-ethnic frame focuses on the costs of increased immigration from low-
skilled immigrants. Current research shows that individuals tend to associate low-skilled
immigration with Latinos (Brader et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). The implicit,
nationality-based frame utilizes the same framing as explicit messages, but replaces direct
references to Mexicans with nouns or adjectives in reference to immigrants crossing the
border. I expect the label \low-skilled" immigrant to carry an implicit connection to Latino
immigrants. Since issues of immigration reform are expressed through border security and
Mexican-based immigration, I expect cues about \immigrants crossing the border" to carry
an implicit connection to Mexican immigrants.
Counter-stereotypical appeals exclude any direct references to Latinos. Explicit, counter-
stereotypical appeals, in this case, implicate Canadian immigrants in arguments to decrease
continued immigration. Canadian and European immigrants are both overtly and implicitly
implied in debates regarding high-skilled immigration (Hochschild and Cropper 2010). This
provides some validation in using Canadian immigrants as a counter-stereotypical appeal
since they are relatively high skilled compared to Caribbean or Mexican immigrants. Thus,
I expect counter-stereotypical appeals not to activate Latino group interests in candidate
support.
After listening to the NPR news story, participants answer a brief post-test battery of
questions concerning their reactions to the news script. To conrm that the messages are
in fact perceived as dierent by subjects, respondents then answer a series of questions
conrming accurate descriptions of the news story. Finally, subjects complete an extensive
battery of post-test questions about their intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas
Wilson, their identity considerations, their support for various immigration policies, and
opinions toward immigrants. Upon completion, subjects are debriefed and paid.15
15Participants were only told that the clip they listened to was not featured on National Public Radio
in order to evaluate identity considerations two-weeks later. At the end of the survey, participants were
57The experiment was carried out in computer labs at Bronx Community College (BCC)
in the Bronx, New York and LaGuardia Community College in Queens, New York. 16 I
recruited students, sta, and non-student adult subjects to participate by distributing yers
throughout areas surrounding each university. Subjects received 10 dollars cash for their
participation at the end of the survey. While students constitute a majority of the sample,
it is important to note that both La Guardia and BCC enroll students from a wide array
of age and socioeconomic groups than most private or state universities. The experiment
was conducted at LaGuardia Community College from June 21, 2010 to August 6, 2010
and Bronx Community College from August 16 to September 22, 2010 and takes an average
of 30 minutes to complete. A total of 192 non-Mexican Latino groups participated in the
experiment. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the number of participants in each condition.
Table 2.2: Experimental Conditions and Sample Size
Explicit Cues Implicit Cues
Pan-Immigrant: Anti-Latino (N=36) Anti-Low Skilled (N=40)
Nationality-Based: Anti-Mexican (N=37) Anti-Border (N=39)
Counter-Stereotypical: Anti-Canadian (N=40)
reminded that they agreed to participate in a follow-up interview by phone or email two weeks later, at
which point they answered 10 similar questions from the rst phase of the experiment pertaining to identity.
To retain subjects for the two-week follow-up, participants' names were placed in a rae to win 100 dollars
at the end of the experimental study. While the results are not included in this paper, the response rate for
phase 2 of the experiment was nearly 31%.
16The experiment is conducted in NYC given the City's growth and diversity in Latino nationalities.
Latinos accounted for 28% of NYCs total population in 2008. Approximately 50% of Puerto Ricans and 35%
of Dominicans reside in the Bronx; the two largest Latino groups in the borough. Queens is more diverse
demographically across Latino subgroups. About 25% of Puerto Rican and Ecuadorians reside in Queens
compared to Dominicans (18%), Mexicans (16%), and Colombians (14%).
58Participant Demographics
Table 2.3 provides a snapshot of the demographics of participants across all conditions.
The median age of participants is 21 years old, ranging between 18 and 72 years, and the av-
erage participant graduated from high school. The top six ethnic groups represented include
Dominicans (41%), Puerto Ricans (22%), Ecuadorians (9%), Colombians (10%), Peruvians
(5%), and Salvadorans (3%). 17 The sample is also similar in terms of gender, 47 per-
cent male and 53 percent female. Moreover, 39 percent of participants are rst generation
immigrants, 53 percent are second generation, and 7 percent are third generation.18 Ap-
proximately 20% of respondents reported that they were naturalized citizens. 19 In terms of
ideology and partisanship, 24 percent are liberal and about 59 percent classied themselves
as \middle of the road." Moreover, 49 percent identied themselves as Democrats.
This sample is not perfectly representative of all US Latinos, but is representative of
Latinos in New York City. Table 2.4 compares demographics for Latinos in the U.S. and
New York City. The median age for U.S. Latinos is 27 and 31 years old in New York
City (2009 American Community Survey, US Census, Latino Population of New York City,
2009). Approximately 24 percent of U.S. Hispanics have graduated from high school. This
percentage is relatively the same in New York City with 26.6% completing high school. The
median family income of all U.S. Latinos is 40;000 and is slightly lower in New York City
(35;800). Mexicans are the largest Hispanic origin group in the United States, representing
almost 65% of all Latinos (2009 American Community Survey, US Census). In New York
17The missing 10 percent includes Mexicans. However, this is excluded in the following empirical models.
18I dene rst generation immigrants as those persons born outside the United States. I do not include the
1.5 generation immigrants, those who immigrate early in life, within this category for empirical simplicity
given the size of this sample. With greater numbers of respondents, it may be possible to isolate this
group. I dene second immigrants as those born within the United States whose parents are born outside
the United States. I included those with both or one parent born outside the United States. Lastly, third
generation immigrants are those born within the United States and with parents born within the United
States. However, grandparents are born outside the United States.
19Participants were asked in the survey whether they are naturalized citizens. About 119 respondents or
61% of respondents skipped this question in the survey. I believe much of the confusion involves the term
\naturalized citizen." I correct for this in the next chapter by excluding the term naturalized.
59Table 2.3: Participant Demographics
Demographic Characteristics
Age (Median) 21
Education High School Graduate
Income 35;000 - 44;999
Gender (% Female) 53%
First Generation 39%
Second Generation 53%
Third Generation 7%
Naturalized Citizen 20%
Unreported Citizenship 59%
Dominican 41%
Puerto Rican 22%
Ecuadorian 9%
Colombian 10%
Peruvian 5%
Salvadoran 3%
Political Characteristics
"Middle of the Road" 59%
Democrat 49%
The percentage of Latino national origin groups collected in this study does not add up to 100% since
Mexican participants were excluded for analysis
City, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans constitute the largest Latino groups. About 32.9% of
New York City's Latino population is Puerto Rican and 24.9% is Dominican. The 2006
Latino National Survey indicates that 13.1% of Latinos consider themselves liberal and 34%
identify as Democrat. There are signicant dierences in American citizenship between U.S.
Latinos and those in New York City. Of all US Latinos, only 43.7% are U.S. citizens whereas
75% of Latinos in New York City are American citizens. This may reect demographic
dierences between Latinos in the United States and New York City. Mexicans represent
almost 65% of all US Latinos and a signicant portion of Mexican are non-citizens. However,
Puerto Ricans, who represent the largest Latino national origin group in New York City
are citizens by birth. Despite these dierences, this NYC sample does contain reasonable
60variation along several important demographic indicators and provides an interesting case
study of how non-Mexican Latino groups in non-Border States respond to immigrant political
rhetoric.
Table 2.4: Demographics of US and NYC Latinos
US Latinos NYC Latinos
Age 27 31
Education (Completed High School) 23.7% 26.6%
Family Income (Median) $40,000 $35,800
Mexican 65% 13.5%
Puerto Rican 9.1% 32.9%
Salvadoran 3.6% 1.6%
Cuban 3.5% 1.7%
Dominican 2.8% 24.9%
Guatemalan 2.2% 1.3%
Colombian 1.9% 4.9%
Honduran 1.3% 1.8%
Ecuadorian 1.3% 8.9%
Peruvian 1.2% 1.1%
Liberal 13.1%
Democrat 34%
US Citizenship 43.7% 75%
Source: American Community Survey, 2009, Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2000 Census (5%
IPUMS) and 2009 American Community Survey (1% PUMS), 2010 Census Summary File 1, 2006 Latino
National Survey, Latino Population of New York City 2009, Center for Latin American, Caribbean and
Latino Studies, CUNY
Measuring Exposure and Manipulation Checks
To verify that individuals were exposed to a political message, I asked respondents to
recall the representative's name and the specic group discussed in the news story. Approx-
imately 82 percent of all participants accurately recalled the name of the primary represen-
tative mentioned in the story. Moreover, 88 percent of participants recalled that the central
topic discussed in the news report was about immigration compared to other answer choices
61which included the economy, education, the Iraq War, or Apple's IPad tablet. I also asked
respondents to recall the group mentioned in the news clip. Answer choices include Latino
immigrants, Mexican immigrants, Canadian immigrants, low-skilled immigrants, border-
crossing immigrants, and high-skilled immigrants. About 83 percent of individuals within
the anti-Latino condition accurately recalled the Latino immigrants were mentioned in the
news report. The percentage of respondents is slightly higher in the anti-Mexican condition
(92 percent). Moreover, 80 percent of subjects in the anti-Canadian condition accurately
recalled the group mentioned. On the other hand, subjects were not able to accurately recall
the group mentioned in the low-skilled and border-crossing conditions. Approximately 58
percent in the low-skilled recalled this group was mentioned compared to 46% in the border-
crossing condition.
As a manipulation check of the implicit cues, I asked subjects at the end of the post-
test battery to indicate which groups come to mind reading the following news headlines,
\Low-Skilled Immigration Top Priority for Representative" and \Border-Crossings Top Pri-
ority for Representative." The answer choices included Latino, Mexican, Asian, European,
and Canadian immigrants. In terms of low-skilled immigrants, 40 percent of participants
believe low-skilled immigrants are Latino immigrants and 37 percent mention Mexican im-
migrants. Here, there is not a clear consensus as to whether participants have all Latinos
or just Mexicans in mind when it comes to low-skilled immigrants. Moreover, 76 percent of
participants indicate that Mexican immigrants come to mind reading a news headline about
border-crossings into the U.S whereas only 12 percent mentioned Latino immigrants. At
least at the preliminary level, the data suggests that exposure to explicit or implicit cues
around Mexican and Latino immigration create images of particular national origin groups
within political elite immigration debates.
62Determinants of Vote Choice
The rst pattern of results to evaluate is whether non-Mexicans express less of a preference
to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson under exposure to pan-ethnic political appeals
in which Latinos are collectively targeted. In this case, I simply calculated the percentage of
all subjects who intend to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson in each condition. Only
19% of all respondents in the anti-Latino condition indicated they would vote for Wilson
compared to 23% in the anti-border and anti-Canadian condition, 27% in the anti-Mexican
condition, and 33% in the anti-low skilled condition.
I model subjects' intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson as a function of
each treatment with those exposed to the counter-stereotypical appeal (or the Anti-Canadian
appeal) as the baseline condition. Table 2.5 displays these results. I nd that both explicit
and implicit anti-immigrant appeals are not statistically dierent from the baseline (Anti-
canadian) condition.
Table 2.5: Predicting Vote Support, by Condition
Coecient Standard Error
Anti-Latino -0.85 (0.40)
Anti-Low Skilled 0.28 (0.53)
Anti-Mexican -0.03 (0.55)
Anti-Border -0.09 (0.56)
Intercept -0.85 (0.40)
N 164
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions
to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity
consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional;
signicance tests are one-tailed.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Representative Nicholas Wil-
son across each condition. While the directions of the resultant dierences in the level of
63support for Representative Wilson are consistent with my hypothesis (H1), the dierences
are not statistically signicant. Despite these insignicant dierences across conditions in
predicting vote support, we cannot rule out the possibility that the type of message made
little dierence in the vote calculations of non-Mexican Latinos. There may be dierences
in the considerations subjects bring to bear on their decisions not to support Representative
Wilson across conditions. Therefore, I turn to evaluate the causal mechanisms under which
dierent anti-immigrant appeals might shape voting preferences for non-Mexican Latino
groups.
Figure 2.3: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson by Condition
Anti−Latino Anti−Border Anti−Mexican Anti−Canadian Anti−Low Skilled
Conditions
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This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 2.5 predicting vote support for Representative
Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian condition as the baseline.
The graph is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition
64Latino Group in Candidate Support
I now consider the role of collective group interests in shaping Latino vote choice. The
racial politics literature denes two components of racial group interests that are critical to
the political process: perceptions of linked fate and evaluations of relative economic group
status (Dawson 1994). I compare levels of linked fate, shared economic and political interests
with other Latinos as well with one's own national origin group across experimental condi-
tions. Latino Linked fate is measured asking subjects the extent to which they believe what
happens to other Latinos or Hispanics in this country has something to do with what happens
in their own lives (Dawson 1994). National linked fate is measured using the same question,
substituting Latino identication with an individual's national origin group. Latino economic
interests are measured assessing the degree to which subjects believe they share common job
opportunities, education, or income with other Latinos or Hispanics. National economic
interests are measured asking respondents whether they share common job opportunities,
education, or income with their own national origin group. Latino political interests are eval-
uated asking subjects whether they share \things like government services and employment,
political power, and representation" with other Latinos or Hispanics. National political in-
terests are assess using the same preceding question, but replaces \Latino/Hispanic" with
the respondent's national origin group. I also create an index for each dimension of Latino
identity. The National Origin index is a summary of national origin linked fate, national
origin economic commonality, and national origin political commonality. Similarly, pan-
ethnic considerations is a summary of Latino linked fate, Latino economic commonality, and
Latino political commonality. Each index ranges from 4 to 12, with 12 indicating greater
perceptions of collective group interests. Mean scores for each identity consideration along
with each index across conditions is included in Table 2.6. Across conditions, ethnic identity
considerations are relatively balanced.
I hypothesize that non-Mexicans with higher perceptions of Latino group interests will be
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66less likely to support a candidate using pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals (H1A). Table 2.7
displays my results of this second test. Each column represents a separate logit regression
equation where voting support for Representative Wilson is regressed upon each identity
consideration separately(listed in the column head), dummy variables for each treatment
condition (with those exposed to anti-Canadian appeals as the excluded category), and
interactions between each identity consideration and treatment to capture the slope shift
associated with exposure to each anti-immigrant appeal. Based on this model specication,
I can compare the baseline eect (anti-Canadian appeal) of identity with the impact of those
same identity consideration in the presence of various explicit and implicit appeals targeting
Latino immigrants. To guard against the possibility that socio-demographic variables might
account for dierences observed, I control for household income and foreign-born status in
each model (See Table E.1 in Appendix for covariate balance check across conditions). 20
The functional form of the model is as follows:
Voting for Representative Wilson = B1(Identity Consideration)
+B2 (Anti-Latino Condition)
+B3 (Anti-Latino Condition * Identity Consideration)
+B4 (Anti-Mexican Condition)
+B5 (Anti-Mexican Condition * Identity Consideration)
+B6 (Anti-Low Skilled Condition)
+B7 (Anti-Low Skilled Condition * Identity Consideration)
+B8 (Anti-Border Condition)
+B9 (Anti-Border Condition * Identity Consideration)
+B10 (Controls) + Constant
My second hypothesis hinges most directly on the direction and magnitude of coecient
B3. Table 2.7 presents all the coecients and standard errors for the eect of pan-ethnic
considerations. My predictions are unidirectional such that if pan-ethnic considerations are
20This decision was largely driven by looking at the covariates across each condition. Median household
income is 25,000-34,000 in each condition except the Anti-Mexican condition, which has a median household
income of 35,000-44,999. The Anti-Mexican condition is also composed of 27% of rst generation immigrants
whereas the percentage of rst-generation immigrants range from 39 to 46% in all other conditions.
67Table 2.7: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson with Pan-ethnic Attitudes, by
Condition
Latino LF Latino Economic Latino Political Summary
Identity Consideration -0.36 0.77 0.62 0.15
(see column heading) (0.47) (0.54) (0.52) (0.21)
Conditions
Anti-Latino -1.45 3.84 5.14 3.82
(1.82) (2.18) (2.26) (2.52)
Anti-Mexican -0.48 1.96 2.94 2.20
(1.81) (2.37) (2.12) (2.56)
Anti-Low Skilled 0.91 4.59 3.14 3.70
(1.81) (2.46) (2.06) (2.52)
Anti-Border -0.66 0.61 2.58 1.68
(1.76) (2.53) (2.05) (2.62)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Identity 0.41 -1.48 * -2.06 * -0.51 .
(0.65) (0.74) (0.82) (0.30)
Anti-Low Skilled: Identity -0.18 -1.44 . -1.01 -0.40
(0.64) (0.80) (0.69) (0.29)
Anti-Mexican: Identity 0.16 -0.67 -1.04 -0.26
(0.64) (0.74) (0.71) (0.29)
Anti-Border: Identity 0.22 -0.25 -1.00 -0.22
(0.64) (0.77) (0.72) (0.30)
Controls
Foreign-Born -0.18 -0.24 -0.35 -0.19
(0.64) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Income 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of cases 162 161 157 157
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating inten-
tions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately.
The model \summary" that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political
commonality. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity consideration in the anti-
Canadian condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
68primed, the interactions will be negative given Representative Wilson's anti-immigrant po-
sition. I expect pan-ethnic political appeals, those targeting Latinos collectively, to increase
the salience of Latino group interests in decreased voting support for Representative Nicholas
Wilson among non-Mexican Latino groups (H1A).
Consistent with my hypotheses, I nd that Latino group interests structure the voting
preferences of non-Mexican Latinos. Individuals with higher perceptions of \Latino" group
interests will be less likely to vote for Representative Wilson under exposure to pan-ethnic
appeals. In model two (Economic) of Table 2.7, the coecient for the interaction between
Latino economic interests and the anti-Latino cue is negative and statistically signicant at
the 0.05 level. When the candidate explicitly targets Latino immigrants, non-Mexicans with
high perceptions of shared economic interests with other Latinos are signicantly less likely
to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson. Although signicant at the 10% level, I also nd
that exposure to implicit pan-ethnic appeals (anti-low skilled condition) activate perceptions
of shared economic interests with Latinos in a decision not to support Representative Wilson.
However, a conventional standard of statistical signicance is a level of 5% or lower. Yet, is
worthy of note, in this case, based on my general hypothesis that non-Mexicans with higher
perceptions of Latino group interests will be less likely to vote for Representative Wilson
under exposure to both explicit and implicit pan-ethnic political appeals.
To assess the magnitude of these eects, I plot in Figure 2.4 the predicted probability
of voting for Representative Wilson between low and high economically identied Latinos
across all ve experimental conditions with 95% condence intervals. The dierence between
low and high economic identiers in voting for Representative Wilson within the anti-Latino
condition is 0.38 or 38%. When exposed to an explicit cue about decreasing Latino immi-
gration, non-Mexicans who perceive they share \nothing" in common with other Latinos
economically, have an 50% likelihood of voting for Representative Nicholas Wilson whereas
those who perceive they share \a lot" in common with other Latinos economically only have
69a 12% likelihood of voting for this same candidate. We observe a similar pattern of results
for those exposed to an implicit pan-ethnic appeal (anti Low-Skilled condition). Again, the
interaction between Latino economic interests and the anti low-skilled condition is signicant
at the 0.10 level. Yet, it is worthy of note here that the dierence here between low and high
economic identiers in voting for Representative Wilson within the anti low-skilled condition
is 0.40 or 40%.
Figure 2.4: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Latino Economic
Interests and by Condition
Anti−Latino Anti−Low Skilled Anti−Mexican Anti−Border Anti−Canadian
Conditions
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This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model 2 (Economic), Table 2.7 predicting vote
support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian
condition as the baseline with 95% condence intervals. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest probability
of Wilson support among high economic identiers.
While the 95% condence intervals overlap, there is still a signicant dierence in the means,
particularly in the anti-Latino condition where the interaction between shared Latino eco-
70nomic interests and the anti-Latino condition is signicant at the 0.05 level. Generally, when
comparing two parameter estimates, it is always true that non-overlapping condence inter-
vals indicate statistical signicance. However, this is a conservative test. If two condence
intervals do overlap, as presented in this case, the dierence between the two means are still
signicantly dierent (Knezevic 2008, StatNews 73).
Similarly, we observe that perceptions of political commonality are activated under ex-
posure to anti-Latino appeals. When exposed to anti-Latino appeals, Latinos with higher
perceptions of shared Latino political interests are less likely to vote for Representative Wil-
son. Figure 2.5 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Wilson among Latinos with
low versus high perceptions of shared political interests with Latinos across conditions. In
the anti-Latino condition, the dierence between Latinos with low versus high perceptions
of shared political interests is 65% or (0.65) and is statistically signicant as observed by
the non-overlapping condence intervals. When exposed to an explicit anti-immigrant ap-
peal targeting all Latino immigrants, Latinos with higher perceptions of shared pan-ethnic
political interests are only 6% likely to vote for Wilson. On the other hand, Latinos with
low perceptions of shared political interests are 71% likely to vote for Wilson when exposed
to the anti-Latino cue. While high political identiers have a lower probability of voting for
Wilson under exposure to anti-low skilled, anti-Mexican, and anti-border conditions, we do
not nd a signicance dierence in the means or condence intervals.
Moreover, the pattern of results are reversed under anti-Canadian (counter-stereotypical)
appeals. The dierences here are not statistically signicant, but suggest that politically
identied Latinos have a higher probability of voting for Wilson under the anti-Canadian
cue. One possibility for this result is that American identities are activated when an out-
group is made salient by anti-immigrant appeals. If the message is to protect American
interests from Canadian immigration, Latinos may nd it within their interests to vote for
Representative Wilson. However, more research is needed to uncover the role of American
71identities in Latino political decision-making under exposure to anti-immigrant rhetoric.
Figure 2.5: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Latino Political
Interests and by Condition
Anti−Latino Anti−Low Skilled Anti−Mexican Anti−Border Anti−Canadian
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This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model 3 (Political), Table 2.7 predicting vote
support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian
condition as the baseline with 95% condence intervals. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest dierence
between low and high politically identied Latinos.
The last column in Table 2.7 estimates the eect of all pan-ethnic considerations on vote
support across conditions using a summary measure of Latino linked fate, perceptions of
economic and political commonality. While only signicant at the 0.10 level, the dierences
in the level of voting support under anti-Latino appeals are consistent with my hypotheses.
Latino group interests are only activated under exposure to anti-Latino appeals.
Moreover, we also observe that non-Mexicans' voting preferences are not a direct func-
tion of Latino group interests under exposure to anti-Mexican or anti-border political appeals
72(H2). Exposure to nationality-based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants, whether explicit
or implicit, did not activate Latino group interests in a decision not to vote for Representa-
tive Nicholas Wilson. In sum, perceptions of linked fate, economic, and political interests are
not salient predictors of decreased voting support for Representative Wilson under exposure
to appeals directly or indirectly targeting Mexican immigrants.
To test the robustness of my ndings, I consider whether other ethnic group interests
are made salient by anti-immigrant appeals. The central argument of this paper is that
for group-based mobilization to occur among non-Mexican Latino groups, Latinos of diverse
national origin groups must perceive commonality within their economic and political ex-
periences (Padilla 1985). The political environment determines when and how members of
distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as \Latinos" or as members of their respective
national origin group (Padilla 1985). If my hypothesis is correct that pan-ethnic appeals
are important in making Latino group interests salient among non-Mexican Latino groups,
we should not nd any evidence that these appeals activate national origin considerations.
Table 2.8 illustrates the eect of national origin considerations on voting support for Repre-
sentative Wilson across conditions. I do not nd any evidence that perceptions of linked fate,
economic, or political commonality with an individual's national origin group are activated
by anti-immigrant appeals in candidate support.
Lastly, Table 2.9 examines whether non-Mexicans rely upon partisanship in their eval-
uation of Representative Wilson when exposed to counter-stereotypical appeals (H3). The
results for party identication in the baseline condition (anti-Canadian) are presented in
the rst row. 21 While the coecient is negative, I nd that party identication is not
a signicant predictor of support for Wilson for those exposed to political messages about
decreasing Canadian immigration. Moreover, partisanship is not a signicant predictor of
decreased voting support for Wilson in the presence of ethnic appeals.
21Party identication is recoded to a binary variable such that Democrats are coded 1 and all else 0.
73Table 2.8: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson with National Origin Attitudes,
by Condition
National LF National Economic National Political Sum
Identity Consideration -0.27 -0.20 -0.82 -0.23
(see column heading) (0.43) (0.41) (0.45) (0.18)
Conditions
Anti-Latino 1.17 -0.84 -2.68 0.39
(1.76) (2.34) (2.19) (3.08)
Anti-Mexican 0.35 0.92 -1.36 0.67
(1.60) (2.05) (1.87) (2.43)
Anti-Low Skilled 0.92 -0.17 -3.96 -1.63
(1.48) (1.89) (1.86) (2.02)
Anti-Border -1.38 -1.07 -2.98 -2.48
(1.71) (1.82) (1.66) (2.25)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Identity -0.68 0.16 0.96 -0.06
(0.75) (0.78) (0.76) (0.37)
Anti-Low Skilled: Identity -0.26 0.17 1.56 0.25
(0.59) (0.64) (0.65) (0.25)
Anti-Mexican: Identity -0.12 -0.25 0.56 -0.05
(0.62) (0.74) (0.72) (0.30)
Anti-Border: Identity 0.51 0.39 1.15 0.31
(0.65) (0.65) (0.62) (0.28)
Controls
Foreign-Born -0.16 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Income 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Intercept -0.21 -0.48 0.92 0.71
(1.13) (1.23) (1.19) (1.42)
Number of cases 159 154 150 147
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions
to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The
model \Sum" combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The
baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition.
* p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
74Table 2.9: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson by Partisan Identication and by
Condition
Coecient Standard Error
Party (1=Democrat) -0.32 (0.81)
Conditions
Anti-Latino 0.03 (0.78)
Anti-Low Skilled 0.22 (0.73)
Anti-Mexican -0.40 (0.76)
Anti-Border -0.20 (0.77)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Party -0.89 (1.24)
Anti-Low Skilled: Party 0.22 (1.07)
Anti-Mexican: Party 0.72 (1.11)
Anti-Border: Party 0.25 (1.13)
Controls
Foreign-Born -0.30 (0.38)
Income 0.05 (0.07)
Intercept -0.81 (0.69)
Number of cases 162
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions
to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity
consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional;
signicance tests are one-tailed.
75Discussion and Conclusion
This paper builds upon previous research by shedding new light on the political prefer-
ences of non-Mexican Latino groups in New York City. Prior research focuses on the political
experiences of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans in California, Texas, or Arizona
(Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson and Se-
gura 2006). While Mexicans have become the largest immigrant and minority group in the
United States, an unresolved question in the literature on Latino politics is whether processes
of collective identity formation among Mexicans are generalizable to other Latino national
origin groups. The results presented in this paper suggest that not all anti-immigrant polit-
ical messages resonate among non-Mexican Latino groups. I nd that only explicit appeals
in which Latinos are targeted are eective in activating Latino group interests in decreased
voting support for candidates using anti-Latino political appeals.
Media attention on the politics of immigration generally focuses on the experiences of
Mexican immigrants. As the largest minority group with higher levels of undocumented
immigration relative to other groups, Mexicans have come to occupy a prominent position in
the politics of US immigration. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants in
elite immigration discourse, I also nd that both explicit and implicit nationality-based cues
about Mexican immigration do not activate collective identity considerations in the voting
decisions of non-Mexicans.
The experience of racialization among minority groups involves two sides to the coin:
the public's view of the collective group and how groups view themselves. While some have
argued that the American publics treatment and recognition of Latinos, regardless of na-
tional origin membership or generational status, is often the same, the results suggest that
we remain cautious in generalizing about the presumed pan-ethnic experience in America.
Latinos are aware of these dierences more than so presumably than the general public.
These dierences are likely to aect which types of anti-immigrant messages resonate among
76Mexican versus non-Mexican Latino groups (Defrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006).
The study has important implications for the future incorporation of Latinos within the
American context. Political parties and candidates need to be particularly cautious about
how they use the issue of immigration to mobilize the American public and its consequences
on the Latino vote. Some anti-immigrant messages have the potential of mobilizing all Lati-
nos while other political messages may segment the Latino vote. While most Latinos are
less likely to support a candidate with an anti-immigrant political agenda, non-Mexicans in
New York City are signicantly less likely to vote for a candidate with a message targeting
the collective group. We do not observe these same eects under exposure to explicit or
implicit anti-immigrant political appeals targeting Mexicans. Collective groups interests are
not activated in the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups under exposure to direct
or indirect appeals targeting Mexican immigrants.
The results also suggest how Latino activists and political elites can promote collective
group interests to gain electoral advantage. The US political system rewards those groups
with a strong, palpable presence and a set of well-articulated interests (Browning, Tabb,
and Marshall 1994; Schmidt 2000; McAdam 1999). Thus, the extent to which elected o-
cials and organization can elicit these pan-ethnic considerations on a national stage through
common economic experiences may bring symbolic and material rewards for the political
incorporation of Latinos as a cohesive group.
There are three important limitations in this study to address. First, while ambitious,
this study does contain a relatively small convenience sample of non-Mexican Latino respon-
dents. Sample size is always a concern in determining the probability of making a correct
estimate. The larger one's sample, the more accurate one can be that it reects the pop-
ulation of interest. This would indicate that if the sample size was larger, our condence
intervals would be small as well. The condence intervals generated in the preceding models
are large given the size of this New York City sample. However, this study relies upon a
77sample of 192 non-Mexican Latino groups compared to previous experimental studies with
a sample of 63 (McConnaughy, White, Leal, and Casellas 2010). More importantly, it sheds
light on the causal mechanisms of voting among non-Mexican groups, which has not been
fully addressed in recent research (Barreto 2007).
Second, non-Mexican subjects in the New York City are not given a cue to their own
national origin group. Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Colombians, and even Ecuadorians may
respond dierently if their own group is targeted in an anti-immigrant appeal. Moreover,
Puerto Rican and even Dominican identity is just as salient in New York City as Mexican
identity in Los Angeles. While important, nationality-based appeals, in this dissertation,
are dened around the interests of Mexican immigrants given their prominence in Ameri-
can immigration debates. Mexican immigrants are frequently targeted in national debates
to curtail immigration, particularly undocumented immigration. Puerto Ricans, who are
all American citizens, are less likely to be targeted in national eorts to decrease immigra-
tion. With these considerations in mind, the primary goal of this research was to determine
whether explicit and implicit appeals around Mexican immigration resonate among non-
Mexican Latino groups. The results presented in this article suggest that we take seriously
the complexity of Latino group identity in the United States. Given this diversity, we should
expect the processes by which Latino identities are activated by anti-immigrant political
rhetoric to be dierent for non-Mexican Latino groups.
Third, the New York City experiment does not incorporate Mexican immigrants, prevent-
ing us from evaluating the eect of anti-immigrant appeals on Mexican immigrants. While
Puerto Ricans and Dominicans represent the largest Latino groups in the City, Mexicans
have been the fastest growing Latino group. In 1990, they numbered only 58,000 or 3.3%
of the total Latino population. In 2009, they increased to nearly 320,000 or 13.5% (Latino
Data Project, Report 43, 2011). If annual population growth rates are consistent over time,
Mexicans will surpass both Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in 2030, becoming the City's
78largest national Latino sub-group. The weakness of the data is that it solely focuses on
non-Mexicans, missing these important trends.
Moreover, left unresolved is whether we can expect the same type of anti-immigrant ap-
peals to resonate among Mexican immigrants in Border States such as California. Given the
consistent \replenishment" of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the Southwest and the
constant political battles at play over immigrant rights in cities such as Los Angeles, Mexican
identity may be increasingly salient for Mexicans in these regions. Pan-ethnic identities as
a political resource may not particularly meaningful yet if an individual's social connections
and personal networks are limited to a single national origin group at the neighborhood
level. There is considerable debate as to whether this concept of pan-ethnicity links with
demographic reality (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). The next stage of this research is to
conduct this study in a context more nationally representative of Mexican immigrants to
determine which types of political messages resonate most with Mexicans as compared to
non-Mexicans.
79{ Essay Three {
Activating Mexican Identity:
The Determinants of Vote Choice in Response to Ethnic Cues in
Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric
\At the heart of Latino or Hispanic ethnic identity are the circumstantial conditions of
structural or institutional inequality"
- Felix M. Padilla, Latino Ethnic Consciousness, 1985
Abstract
Empirical evidence from essay two suggests that among non-Mexican Latino groups
only explicit, pan-ethnic appeals in which Lations are targeted activate pan-ethnic
group interests in a decision not to support a political candidate. Left unresolved,
however, is whether political processes of collective identity formation among non-
Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Mexicans in Border States. In a
laboratory experiment, I test the eects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-
stereotypical political appeals on the salience of identity in candidate support among
Mexicans and non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. I nd that not all anti-immigrant political
messages resonate among Mexicans as they do for non-Mexicans. There are conditions
upon which collective identity is activated. I nd that only nationality-based political
appeals targeting Mexicans activate Mexican group interests in decreased voting sup-
port for a political candidate. Conversely, these results do not extend to non-Mexicans
in Los Angeles. Exposure to pan-ethnic and nationality-based political appeals did
not activate perceptions of shared ethnicity among non-Mexicans. These ndings not
only suggest that identity activation in contexts of threat may work dierently for non-
Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans, but they also have important implications
for the future incorporation of Latinos on a national political stage.
Introduction
Public discontent over illegal immigration and rapid population growth from Mexico has
divided candidates and political parties in their attempts to maintain existing political coali-
tions and garner votes from this new emerging electorate. While some political elites have
relied on more inclusive strategies to capture the Latino vote, others have relied on exclu-
sionary political appeals at the expense of losing Latino voters. The 2010 midterm elections
illustrate these trends. In Nevada, Democratic Senator Harry Reid won against Sharron
Angle, the Republican contender, who in the nal two weeks of the 2010 campaign targeted
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Tancredo accused Democrat John Hickenlooper of supporting \sanctuary city" policies to
protect illegal immigrants (Foley 2010). In both cases, political candidates targeting Mexi-
can immigrants lost the Latino vote by a substantial margin, resulting in their defeat.
The immediate consequence has been the awakening of what many political pundits and
scholars once characterized as the \sleeping giant" of American politics. Between 2000 and
2010, the number of eligible Latino voters increased from 13.2 million in 2000 to 21.3 million
in 2010 (Lopez 2011,\Pew Hispanic Center"), increasing scholarly interest in the role of po-
litical threat on Latino voting behavior (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura
2006; Barreto and Woods 2005). Of central importance from this line of research has been
the activation of shared ethnicity in predicting Latino vote choice. The empirical evidence
suggests that under conditions of threat from anti-immigrant political appeals, Latinos will
coalesce with other Latinos, \even among those with whom they only share the term `Latino'
in common," in decisions to vote for or against political candidates (Barreto 2007).
While the experience of immigration is shared across Latino groups, Mexicans have taken
a prominent role in the national debate about immigration reform. Much of this atten-
tion from academics and political pundits is attributed to undocumented immigration. As
of March 2010, 11.2 unauthorized immigrants were living in the U.S. (Passel and Cohn
2011). Of this number, more than 50 percent were from Mexico (Passel 2011). These de-
mographic trends have stigmatized Mexicans in American immigration discourse, increasing
anti-immigrant appeals and legislation targeting Mexican immigrants. Such racialization has
created shared political identities, which have become the basis for collective political action
(Telles and Oritz 2008).
This article engages with two important research questions: one, under what conditions
does exposure to anti-immigrant political appeals increase or decrease the salience of col-
lective group interests in Latino voting decisions? Two, which types of immigrant political
81messages resonate most with Mexican versus non-Mexican Latino groups? In a laboratory
experiment, I test the eects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical po-
litical appeals on Latino candidate support. I nd that not all anti-immigrant messages
resonate among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in Los Angeles. There are con-
ditions upon which identity is activated. Among Mexicans, I nd that only exposure to
nationality-based appeals in which Mexicans targeted activates Mexican group interests in
a decision not to vote for a political candidate. Among non-Mexicans, I do not nd any
evidence that exposure to pan-ethnic appeals increases the salience of pan-ethnic group in-
terests in voting decisions.
This article forwards our understanding about the consequences of ethnically targeted
political appeals. To do so, I take into account the uidity and complexity of Latino group
identity in the United States, grappling in a unique way with the external conditions that
may foster or minimize collective mobilization among Latinos. I build upon existing re-
search that focuses exclusively on Latinos of Mexican descent in two ways: rst, I clarify
expectations about the responses of non-Mexicans and Mexicans to anti-immigrant political
messages. Second, I dene the forms of group identity relevant to political decision-making
among Mexicans and non-Mexican Latino groups residing within a Border State. These nd-
ings not only suggest that identity activation may work dierently for non-Mexican Latino
groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration threat, but they also have important
implications for the future incorporation of Latinos on a national political stage.
Latino Identities in Context
Padilla (1985) identies the conditions under which national origin or pan-ethnic con-
siderations become salient in politics. Drawing upon ethnographic research on Mexicans
and Puerto Ricans in Chicago, he argues that Latino ethnic identity is a \situational ethnic
identity." Particular features of the social and political environment determine when and
82how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as \Latinos" or as members
of their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985). Of signicance is his attention to
labor markets in the cultivation of \Latinismo." In his view, the creation of Latino ethnic
identity is inextricably tied to Latinos' participation and concentration in low-wage, less
technically advanced industries (Padilla 1985, 7). Panethnic mobilization is \situationally
specic" and is activated under \certain circumstances of inequality experiences, shared by
more than one Spanish-speaking group at a point in time" (Padilla 1985). Shared histories
of economic exclusion between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in metropolitan Chicago create
opportunities for the emergence of a pan-ethnic Latino identity with political salience.
Conversely, when these conditions are not met, individuals may mobilize on the basis
of other salient forms of identity such as national origin. One central assumption behind
Padilla's (1985) theory is that members of at least two or more Spanish-speaking groups live
and perceive shared urban experiences within a geographical space. An important question
that emerges from this research is whether pan-ethnic identities are particularly meaning-
ful if an individual's social connections and networks are limited to a single national origin
group (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Latino populations are spatially dispersed throughout
the United States. Based on Padilla's (1985) theory, the salience of panethnicity in poli-
tics should be particularly low in contexts where there is limited interaction across Latino
groups. To the extent that conditions for intergroup contact are not met, opportunities for
pan-ethnic mobilization may be diminished (Padilla 1985, 164). However, Padilla (1985) does
not address this relationship at length and does not empirically test whether the salience of
pan-ethnic identities exist in contexts outside of Chicago. In this paper, I expand upon this
research by examining whether pan-ethnic versus national origin identities are more salient
among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups and whether political messages about im-
migration can increase or decrease salience of these identities in political decision-making.
83The Accessibility of Mexican Identity
Pan-ethnic considerations may not be particularly accessible in geographic contexts where
a national origin group is sucient in numbers to mobilize eectively on its own. California,
for example, is similar to many Border States in this regard. Historically, Mexican political
inuence has not depended upon the activation of panethnicity. Mexicans have been incred-
ibly strong in exing their own political muscles without coalescing with other Latino groups
given their exceptional size in Border States (Segura and Rodgrigues 2006; Hero 1992). This
does not suggest that other non-Mexican groups such as Guatemalans or Salvadorans are
non-existent within these geographical spaces, but they have not reached a sucient thresh-
old to make panethnicity salient within many immigrant communities.
Ongoing immigration from Mexico has facilitated the emergence of a strong Mexican po-
litical identity. Since 1970, the foreign-born Mexican population has surpassed the number of
foreign-born individuals from European countries (American Community Survey, US Census
Bureau). Estimates from the 2006 American Community Survey reveal that Mexican immi-
grants make up nearly 31 percent, or 11.5 million, of the total U.S. foreign-born population
(American Community Survey, Pew Hispanic Center). Furthermore, levels of unauthorized
immigration are exceptionally high among immigrants from Mexico. Demographer Jerey
Passel (2008) estimates that 59 percent of the foreign-born population comes from Mexico.
These demographic patterns have shaped the demography of many cities. For example,
Mexicans in Los Angeles constitute 79.3% of all Hispanics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan
area, followed by 7.2% of Salvadorans, and 4.3% of Guatemalans (Pew Hispanic Center, 2009
American Community Center).
Los Angeles' growing Mexican immigrant population has increased the salience of Mexi-
can ethnicity for later generation Hispanics and descendants (Jim enez 2010). Jim enez (2010)
argues that \the strength of attachment that people have to an identity rooted in ethnicity
depends in large part on the availability of ethnically linked resources for their construction
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language, style of dress, holidays, and so forth (Alba and Nee 2003). Even when traditions
are not passed from one generation to the next within a family, the presence of a large
Mexican-immigrant population provides abundant opportunities and frequent interactions
across generations that contribute to the construction a strong Mexican identity for later
generation immigrants to share.
Shared economic disadvantages across Mexicans generations also increase the accessibil-
ity of Mexican identity. Evidence based on national statistics show that Mexican Americans
have consistent low socioeconomic status beyond the second generation (Telles and Ortiz
2008). Schooling data across generations has shown that educational attainment improves
from immigrant parents to their children, but remains stagnant between the second and
third generations (Bean et al. 1994; Borjas 1994). Similarly, these low education rates shape
income patterns. Telles and Ortiz (2008) show that personal earnings among original respon-
dents in 1965 and 2000 were below $30,000. Third-generation children earned an average
of $37,600 whereas fourth generation children earned only $30,600 (Telles and Ortiz 2008).
Poverty rates reect these same demographic changes. In 1965, 25 percent of immigrants
were poor. In 2000, the reported poverty rate among original respondents in Los Angeles
was 34% (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Thus, Mexican identity may be more politically accessi-
ble to Mexicans than panethnicity. Ongoing immigration from Mexico coupled with shared
experiences of economic exclusion across generations \replenishes" the salience of Mexican
identity (Jim enez 2010).
Activating Mexican Identity in Politics
The preceding discussion illustrates how demographic patterns and shared experiences
of economic exclusion within a geographic context can increase the accessibility of national
origin identities. However, these identities are not \chronically accessible" in Latino polit-
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can make an already accessible identity even more accessible, leading an individual to give
it greater weight in making decisions about candidates (Chong 1996; Lavine et al. 1996;
Mendelberg 2001). News media and political campaigns about immigration can shape Latino
opinions about candidates by increasing the salience of collective identities in politics. How-
ever, such immigrant rhetoric in campaigns may resonate dierently among Mexicans and
non-Mexicans.
Mexicans have taken a prominent role in the national debate about immigration reform.
Mexico represents the largest source of immigration to the United States. These demo-
graphic trends have stigmatized Mexicans in American immigration discourse, increasing
anti-immigrant appeals and legislation targeting Mexican immigrants. I consider three types
of anti-immigrant political messages that are likely to promote or disrupt ethnic boundaries
in Latino vote choice: pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical political ap-
peals.
Pan-ethnic appeals use words such as \Latino" or \Hispanic" to express anti-immigrant
sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the
collective group. Nationality-based appeals focus on the interests of a particular national
origin group to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory state-
ments, or to portray a threat from the respective group. I focus on Mexican immigrants given
their proximity to national debates about immigration. Counter-stereotypical appeals ex-
press these same sentiments, but focus on a nationality-group less frequently stigmatized in
American immigration debates. I use Canadian immigrants based on their perceived status
as high-skilled immigrants in elite discourse about immigration. I posit that exposure to
nationality-based appeals targeting Mexicans will increase the salience of Mexican identity
among Mexicans in a decision not to vote for a candidate.
86Research Hypotheses
H1: Mexicans will be less likely to vote for a candidate when exposed to nationality-based
appeals targeting their national origin group.
H1A: Mexicans with higher perceptions of Mexican group interests will be less likely
to support a candidate under exposure to anti-immigrant political appeals targeting
their national origin group.
Overview of Methods and Procedures
To examine which types of immigrant political messages resonate among Mexicans, I
designed an experiment to observe how potential voters make political decisions under con-
ditions of threat. I nd the experimental approach useful in its ability not only to hold
constant confounding factors that threaten the validity of causal inference in observational
studies of voting behavior, but also in its ability to use a battery of survey questions to
isolate the mechanism behind Latino vote choice.
I embed a mock audio news clip from National Public Radio (NPR) with a web-based
survey. Upon arriving for the study, participants are asked whether they prefer to complete
the survey in Spanish or English. I rely upon a post-test only design to avoid contamination
of the treatment by pre-test measurement (McConnaughy, White, Leal, and Casellas 2010).
The primary goal is to avoid questions that may prime identity before the experimental cue
is given. Thus, all measures except for basic demographic questions are asked after subjects
are exposed to the treatment.
In article two, non-Mexican Latino respondents were randomized into one of three condi-
tions to test the eect of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical appeals on
candidate support in New York City. This paper replicates the New York City experiment,
with an addition of a control, using a larger sample of Mexicans and non-Mexicans in Los
Angeles, California. In sum, these experiments allow us to evaluate several unresolved issues
87in the literature on Latino political behavior: 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behind vote support by specifying the types of political messages that activate collective
forms of identity between Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. Second, they clarify
which forms of collective identity become most salient to non-Mexicans and Mexican groups
in their decisions not to support a political candidate in contexts of immigration threat.
The experimental conditions emphasize the negative consequences of increased levels of
immigration. The audio clip begins with a mock news reporter from NPR describing two
congressional representatives running for oce in California, Representative Nicholas Wilson
and Chris Peterson, who dier on the issue of immigration reform. Without reference to ei-
ther candidate's political party aliation, the reporter focuses exclusively on Representative
Wilson's position about the potential costs of increased immigration in California. What
changes across conditions is the group discussed by the congressional representative. The
candidate's position on immigration varies in the degree to which he targets Latinos collec-
tively as a group (pan-immigrant appeal), Mexican immigrants (nationality-based appeal),
or Canadian immigrants (counter-stereotypical appeal). The control condition focuses on
Representative Wilson's position against clean energy control standards in California. In
general, he calls for the removal of all caps on greenhouse gas emissions. After being ran-
domly assigned to one of four conditions, subjects answer an extensive battery of post-test
questions, which include questions about their intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas
Wilson, identity considerations, and political attitudes. On completion of the post-test ques-
tionnaire subjects are debriefed and paid.
This experiment is carried out in computer labs at East Los Angeles Community Col-
lege and three community adult schools providing ESL and citizenship classes in Southern
California: Jeerson High Community Adult School, Evans Community Adult School, and
South Gate Community Adult School between June 16 and July 11, 2011. A total of 401
Latinos participated in the experiment, of which 282 are Mexican and 119 are non-Mexican
88groups. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the number of participants in each condition.
Table 3.1: Experimental Conditions and Sample Size
All Latinos Mexicans Non-Mexicans
Pan-ethnic Anti-Latino 100 74 26
Nationality-Based Anti-Mexican 98 66 32
Counter-Stereotypical Anti-Canadian 102 72 30
Control Anti-Clean Energy 101 70 31
Total 401 282 119
Los Angeles Demographics
Table 3.2 provides a snapshot of the demographics of all Latino participants, Mexicans,
and non-Mexicans separately in the Los Angeles experiment. In contrast to New York City,
the Los Angeles sample is nationally representative of U.S. Latinos in terms of national origin
(see table 4). About 65% of all U.S. Latinos are of Mexican descent. In the Los Angeles
experiment, 70% of all participants are Mexican, followed by Salvadorans and Guatemalans.
The median age of all participants is 22 years old. About 32% of all participants have
graduated from high school and the median family income ranges between $15,000 and
$24,000, signicantly lower than the national average for U.S. Latinos ($40,000). Moreover,
46 percent are considered rst generation, 45% are second generation, and 9% are third
generation immigrants. More than half of the Los Angeles participants are American citizens
(62%). Politically, the Los Angeles sample is signicantly more liberal than the U.S. average
for Latinos. Among all U.S. Latinos, 13.1% classify themselves ideologically as liberal and
30% identify with the Democratic Party. In this sample, 30% of participants characterized
themselves as liberal and 49% identify as Democrats.
We also observe slight dierences between Mexican and non-Mexican participants in the
experiment. The non-Mexican participants are slightly older; the median age is 25 years
89Table 3.2: Demographics of Participants in Los Angeles
All Mexicans Non-Mexicans
Age (Median) 22 21 25
Education(High School) 32% 35% 27%
Education (Some College) 34% 37% 29%
Family Income $15,000 - $24,999 $15,000 - $24,999 $15,000 - $24,999
Gender (Female) 47% 48% 46%
First Generation 46% 38% 65%
Second Generation 46% 51% 30%
Third Generation 9% 10% 5%
US Citizenship 64% 69% 53%
Survey Language (English) 62% 69% 47%
Liberal 30% 34% 20%
Democrat 49% 54% 52%
Mexican 70%
Salvadoran 11%
Guatemalan 7%
Honduran 2%
Total 401 282 119
Entries do not add up to 100% for national origin groups since I am only presenting the top national
origin groups represented in the study.
90compared to 21 years among Mexican participants. Moreover, about half of Mexican partic-
ipants are second generation immigrants whereas 65% of non-Mexican participants are rst
generation. However, in terms of education, gender, income, and partisanship, the character-
istics of Mexicans and non-Mexicans are relatively similar. The median income for Mexican
and non-Mexican participants is between $15,000 and $24,999. About 46% of Mexican and
48% of non-Mexican respondents are female. Politically, 54% of Mexican and 52% of non-
Mexican participants identify with the Democratic Party, suggesting few dierences between
the two samples of participants.
This sample is representative of US Latinos on some demographic measures versus others
(see Table 3.3). The median age for US Latinos is 27 years old.(2009 American Community
Survey, U.S. Census). Approximately 24 percent of US Hispanics have graduated from high
school. The median family income of all US Latinos is 40;000. My sample in Los Angeles
has lower median family incomes, ranging from 15;000 to 24;000. Mexicans are the largest
Hispanic origin group in the United States, representing almost 65% of all Latinos (2009
American Community Survey, U.S. Census). Mexicans comprise 70% of my Los Angeles
sample. The 2006 Latino National Survey indicates that 13.1% of Latinos consider them-
selves liberal and 34% identify politically as Democrat. There are signicant dierences in
US citizenship between my sample and US Latinos. Only 43.7% of all Latinos are U.S.
citizens. My sample contains an average of 64% of Latinos who are American citizens.
Measuring Exposure
Among all participants, 90 percent correctly identied Representative Nicholas Wilson's
name in the news report. Moreover, 90 percent of participants randomized into an anti-
immigrant condition indicated the central topic discussed was about immigration. Respon-
dents were also asked to recall the group mentioned in the news clip. In the anti-Latino
condition, 73 percent of all respondents indicated that Latino immigrants were mentioned in
91Table 3.3: Demographics of US Latinos
US Latinos
Age 27
Education (Completed High School) 23.7%
Family Income (Median) $40,000
Mexican 65%
Puerto Rican 9.1%
Salvadoran 3.6%
Cuban 3.5%
Dominican 2.8%
Guatemalan 2.2%
Colombian 1.9%
Honduran 1.3%
Ecuadorian 1.3%
Peruvian 1.2%
Liberal 13.1%
Democrat 34%
US Citizenship 43.7%
Source: American Community Survey, 2009, Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2000 Census (5%
IPUMS) and 2009 American Community Survey (1% PUMS), 2010 Census Summary File 1, 2006 Latino
National Survey
the news clip. The percentage of respondents is slightly lower in the anti-Mexican condition,
with 67 percent recalling the correct group mentioned. In the anti-Canadian condition, 71
percent of Latinos correctly identied Canadian immigrants as the group targeted in the
news clip. Finally, 69 percent of respondents in the control condition accurately recalled
that there was no specic group mentioned.
Immigrant Political Rhetoric and Mexican Vote Choice
The rst test to evaluate is whether Mexicans will be less likely to vote for Represen-
tative Wilson when exposed to nationality-based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants. I
simply calculate the percentage of Mexican subjects who intend to vote for Representative
Nicholas Wilson across experimental conditions. Only 25% of Mexican respondents in the
92anti-Mexican condition indicate they will vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson compared
to 36% in the anti-Latino and 37% in the anti-Canadian conditions. In the control condition,
where subjects listened to a news clip about Representative Wilson's opposition to clean en-
ergy standards, 62% of respondents indicate they will vote for Representative Wilson.
I also model subjects' intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson as a function
of each treatment with those exposed to the control condition as the excluded category. Ta-
ble 3.4 displays these results. I nd that all anti-immigrant appeals are statistically dierent
from the control. Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Representative
Nicholas Wilson across each condition. Subjects in the anti-Mexican condition have a 26%
probability of voting for Representative Wilson whereas those in the anti-Latino and anti-
Canadian condition are 36% likely to vote for Wilson. While the directions and magnitudes
of the resultant dierences in the level of support for Representative Wilson are consistent
with my hypothesis (H1), the dierences across anti-immigrant appeals are not statistically
dierent from each other.
Table 3.4: Predicting Vote Support among Mexicans, by Condition
Coecient Standard Error
Anti-Mexican -1.60 *** (0.38)
Anti-Latino -1.03 ** (0.25)
Anti-Canadian -1.09 ** (0.25)
Intercept 0.50 * (0.25)
N 276
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions
to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity
consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. *** p < 0.001,,** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions
are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
Moreover, we observe a signicant dierence between the anti-immigrant appeals and the
control. In the control condition, Representative Wilson promotes the erosion of clean energy
93standards to protect American workers and families in California. Here, Representative Wil-
son links the economic recession with rising costs associated with maintaining clean energy
control costs. To protect American families, Wilson urges the removal of these standards.
Given Wilson's platform, economic interests might be highly salient in Mexican decisions to
vote for Representative Wilson. These framing eects might account for these signicant
dierence between anti-immigrant political appeals and the control. 22
Figure 3.1: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson among Mexicans by
Condition
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This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 3.4 predicting vote support for Representative
Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the control condition as the baseline. The graph
is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition.
22This condition was emulated from a recent clean energy bill in California in 2010.
94Activating Mexican Ethnicity
Next, I examine the degree to which Mexicans made their vote choice based on collec-
tive group interests. I expect nationality-based political appeals, those implicating Mexican
immigrants in debates to decrease immigration, to increase the salience of Mexican group
interests in a decision not to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson (H1A). I estimate a
model of intended vote choice for Representative Wilson - where 0 indicates intent not to vote
for Representative Wilson and 1 indicates intent to vote for him - as a function of collective
group interests. Voting for Representative Wilson is regressed upon each ethnic attitude,
condition (with the control as the excluded category), and interactions are included between
each ethnic attitude and condition. To measure ethnic attitudes, I rely upon perceptions
of linked fate, shared economic, and political commonality with Mexicans (national origin
group) and Latinos/Hispanics (Pan-ethnic group). For each dimension of ethnic identity -
national origin or pan-ethnic - I also create a summary measure of linked fate, economic,
and political interests. To guard against the possibility that dierences in the distribution
of socio-demographic variables across cells might account for the dierences we observe, I
control for age, sex, and education (See Table F.1 in Appendix for covariates across condi-
tions).
Table 3.5 summarizes the eect of Mexican group interests on voting for Representative
Wilson. The results generally conform to expectations. The coecient on the interaction
between the anti-Mexican condition and shared Mexican economic interests is signicant and
negative. Mexicans with higher perceptions of shared economic interests are signicantly less
likely to vote for Representative Wilson when exposed to anti-immigrant cues implicating
their own national origin group.
To aid interpretation of this eect, I compare the predicted probability of voting for Rep-
resentative Wilson between low and high economically identied Mexicans across conditions
in Figure 3.2. The dierence between low and high Mexican economic identiers in voting
95Table 3.5: Predicting Mexicans' Voting Support for Representative Wilson by
Mexican Identity and by Condition
Mexican LF Mexican Economic Mexican Political Summary
Identity Consideration 0.35 0.20 -0.13 0.12
(see column heading) (0.31) (0.37) (0.36) (0.17)
Conditions
Anti-Latino 0.29 0.37 -1.71 0.39
(1.19) (1.49) (1.27) (1.79)
Anti-Mexican -0.31 1.89 -1.43 1.15
(1.26) (1.61) (1.29) (1.85)
Anti-Canadian -0.46 0.81 -2.67 -0.52
(1.21) (1.60) (1.35) (1.89)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Identity -0.53 -0.52 0.21 -0.18
(0.41) (0.51) (0.45) (0.21)
Anti-Mexican: Identity -0.51 -1.26 * -0.12 -0.35
(0.44) (0.57) (0.48) (0.22)
Anti-Canadian: Identity -0.26 -0.67 0.59 -0.07
(0.41) (0.53) (0.48) (0.22)
Controls
Age 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.17 0.35 0.16 0.20
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Education -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Intercept -0.24 -0.12 0.90 -0.58
(1.07) (1.29) (1.24) (1.58)
Number of cases 254 251 250 249
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating inten-
tions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately.
The model \summary" that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political
commonality. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity consideration in the control
condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
96for Representative Wilson within the anti-Mexican condition is 57 percent. Mexicans with
high perceptions of shared economic interests with other Mexicans are signicantly less likely
to vote for Representative Wilson than those who perceive they have nothing in common
economically with other Mexicans when exposed to a message about decreasing Mexican
immigration. For example, Mexicans with higher perceptions of economic commonality with
other Mexicans have a 7 percent likelihood of voting for Wilson in the anti-Mexican condition
whereas those who perceive they share nothing in common with other Mexicans economically
have a 67 percent chance of voting for Representative Wilson.
Figure 3.2: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Mexican Eco-
nomic Interests and by Condition
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Here I plot the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson between Mexicans with low
and high perceptions of shared economic interest with Mexicans with 95% condence intervals. The graph
is produced using simulation estimates reported in model two of Table 3.5. Each message style is included
as a dummy variable (coded 0 or 1), with the control condition as the contrast group.
97I posit that pan-ethnic identities may not be salient in geographic contexts where there
is limited interaction across dierent national origin groups and where the group is su-
cient in numbers to mobilize eectively on its own. Pan-ethnic identities are not politically
meaningful if an in an individual's social connections and networks are limited to a single
national origin group (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). In the preceding analysis, I nd that
Mexican group interests are activated by nationality-based appeals targeting Mexicans. If
my hypothesis is correct, I should not nd evidence that pan-ethnic considerations are acti-
vated among Mexicans in Los Angeles. In this section, I investigate whether anti-immigrant
appeals increase or decrease the salience of pan-ethnic group interests in Mexican's vote
choice.
Table 3.6 illustrates the eect of pan-ethnic considerations on voting support for Repre-
sentative Wilson across conditions. Again, I consider the role of Latino linked fate, Latino
economic commonality, and Latino political commonality as measures of Latino group inter-
ests. With each measure and summary of Latino group interests, I do not nd any evidence
that pan-ethnic group considerations are activated among Mexicans by anti-immigrant ap-
peals in a decision not to vote for Representative Wilson.
Activating Shared Ethnicity among Non-Mexicans?
Are the responses of Mexicans to immigrant political rhetoric generalizable to non-
Mexicans in Los Angeles? Will non-Mexicans respond in similar ways to non-Mexicans
in New York City? In Article Two, I found that only explicit, pan-ethnic appeals activate
Latino group interests in a decision not to vote for Wilson. In this section, I consider the
role of anti-immigrant appeals in mobilizing collective group interests in the voting decisions
of non-Mexicans.
To estimate the eects of anti-immigrant appeals in shaping candidate support, I model
98Table 3.6: Predicting Mexicans' Voting Support for Representative Wilson by
\Latino" Identity and by Condition
Latino LF Latino Economic Latino Political Summary
Identity Consideration -0.16 -0.19 -0.08 -0.09
(see column heading) (0.38) (0.36) (0.34) (0.15)
Conditions
Anti-Latino -1.34 -0.51 -1.37 -1.26
(1.42) (1.42) (1.26) (1.67)
Anti-Mexican -1.69 -0.67 -1.17 -0.93
(1.44) (1.55) (1.30) (1.83)
Anti-Canadian -2.18 -1.36 -2.31 -3.19
(1.43) (1.49) (1.33) (1.80)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Identity 0.07 -0.25 0.07 0.01
(0.49) (0.48) (0.44) (0.19)
Anti-Mexican: Identity -0.01 -0.37 -0.19 -0.10
(0.50) (0.53) (0.49) (0.22)
Anti-Canadian: Identity 0.36 0.05 0.34 0.22
(0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.20)
Controls
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.17
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Education -0.19 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Intercept 1.31 1.13 0.83 1.67
(1.30) (1.26) (1.16) (1.48)
Number of cases 251 245 247 239
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating inten-
tions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately.
The model \summary" that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political
commonality. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity consideration in the control
condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
99non-Mexicans' decisions to vote for Representative Wilson as a function of each treatment
with those in the control as the excluded category. Table 3.7 illustrates the logit coecients
and standard errors for this test. The coecient for the anti-Latino condition is signif-
icant and negative, suggesting that exposure to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals (anti-
Latino condition) signicantly decreased voting support for Representative Wilson among
non-Mexicans.
Table 3.7: Predicting Vote Support among Non-Mexicans, by Condition
Coecient Standard Error
Anti-Latino -1.30 * (0.57)
Anti-Mexican -0.87 (0.52)
Anti-Canadian -0.78 (0.54)
Intercept 0.49 (0.38)
N 115
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions
to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity
consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional;
signicance tests are one-tailed.
I estimate the magnitude of these eects in Figure 3.3. Here, I illustrate the predicted
probability of voting for Representative Wilson across each condition. There is a signicant
dierence of 30 percent in the means between the anti-Latino condition and the control.
There is not a signicant dierence in the probability of voting for Wilson across the anti-
Latino, anti-Mexican, and anti-Canadian conditions. The ndings are consistent with the
pattern of results we observed in essay two among non-Mexicans in New York City. While
these dierences are not signicant, we do observe less voting support for Wilson in the anti-
Latino condition. Non-Mexicans exposed to a message implicating the collective group have
a 30% likelihood of voting for Wilson whereas in the anti-Mexican condition the probability
is 40%, a 9 percent dierence.
100I now consider whether exposure to pan-ethnic appeals activate Latino group interests
in candidate support among non-Mexicans. I model non-Mexicans'intentions to vote for
Representative Wilson as a function of pan-ethnic group interests, conditions (with the
control as the excluded category), and interactions between the condition and pan-ethnic
identities. I also control for age, sex, and gender to guard against the possibility that
dierences in the distribution of socio-demographic variables across cells might account for
the dierences we observe (See Table F.2 in Appendix for covariates across conditions).
Figure 3.3: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson among Non-
Mexicans by Condition
Anti−Latino Anti−Mexican Anti−Canadian Control
Conditions
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
95% Confidence Intervals
This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 3.7 predicting vote support for Representative
Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the control condition as the baseline. The graph
is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition.
Results of the logit coecients are presented in Table 3.8. The predictions are uni-
directional such that ethnic cues in anti-immigrant appeals should make panethnic group
101interests a signicant predictor of decreased support for Representative Nicholas Wilson.
I do not nd any support that pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical ap-
peals activate Latino group interests in the voting decisions of non-Mexicans in Los Angeles.
Perceptions of Latino ethnicity have no eect on support for Representative Wilson among
non-Mexicans who were exposed to immigrant or non-immigrant (Clean Energy) political
appeals.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of voting for Represen-
tative Wilson between low and high politically identied non-Mexicans across conditions.
The dierence between low and high \Latino" political identiers in voting for Representa-
tive Wilson within the anti-Latino is 10 percent and insignicant. We also do not observe
any signicant dierence across other anti-immigrant conditions in priming Latino political
interests in a decision not to support Wilson.
Figure 3.4: Change in Voting for Representative Wilson Between Low and High
Latino Political Identiers by Condition
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This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model three (Latino Political) of Table 3.8
102Table 3.8: Predicting Non-Mexicans' Voting Support for Representative Wilson
by \Latino" Identity and by Condition
Latino LF Latino Economic Latino Political Summary
Identity Consideration 0.31 0.59 0.14 0.14
(see column heading) (0.45) (0.56) (0.54) (0.23)
Conditions
Anti-Latino 0.14 -0.28 -0.47 -0.48
(1.76) (2.40) (2.04) (2.77)
Anti-Mexican -0.52 -2.06 -3.25 -2.74
(2.16) (2.51) (2.26) (2.93)
Anti-Canadian -0.68 0.83 -0.18 0.62
(1.94) (2.24) (2.03) (2.69)
Interactions
Anti-Latino: Identity -0.61 -0.52 -0.32 -0.14
(0.61) (0.78) (0.70) (0.31)
Anti-Mexican: Identity -0.10 0.49 0.97 0.26
(0.69) (0.80) (0.76) (0.32)
Anti-Canadian: Identity -0.03 -0.49 -0.13 -0.13
(0.65) (0.76) (0.72) (0.32)
Controls
Age 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Female -0.71 -0.85 . -0.76 -0.90 .
(0.47) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
Family Income 0.17 0.28 * 0.19 0.30 *
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14)
Intercept -1.16 -2.18 -0.52 -1.70
(1.66) (1.91) (1.75) (2.28)
Number of cases 95 91 94 89
Note: Entries are logit coecients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating inten-
tions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately.
The model \summary" that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political
commonality. The baseline eect corresponds to the main eect of each identity consideration in the control
condition. * p < 0.05, . p < .10. Predictions are unidirectional; signicance tests are one-tailed.
103Discussion
As the largest minority group with higher levels of undocumented immigration relative
to other Latino national origin groups in the country, Mexicans have come to occupy a
racialized position in American immigration debates. In policies concerning border control
or educational access for undocumented youth (Dream Act), Mexicans are often stigmatized.
This experience of racialization creates shared political identities, which often serve as the
basis for collective political action (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Many scholars posit that the
stigma of being Mexican is often pinned onto other persons from Latin America. While
such processes of categorization may occur in the \American mind," there is an unresolved
question as to whether non-Mexican groups perceive their fates linked with Mexicans in the
context of immigration threat.
This research agenda sheds explanatory light on this question. Several major ndings
emerge from this study. First, anti-immigrant political messages resonate dierently for
Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. Second, there are conditions upon which national
origin versus pan-ethnic identities are activated. Among Mexicans, I nd that nationality-
based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants increase the salience of Mexican group interests
in decisions not to support a political candidate. Conversely, I do not nd any evidence that
pan-ethnic or nationality-based appeals targeting Latinos or Mexicans, respectively, activate
Latino group interests in political decision-making among non-Mexicans.
Panethnic considerations are less accessible in Los Angeles. Historically, Mexican politi-
cal inuence has not depended upon the cultivation of panethnicity. Given their exceptional
size relative to other Latino national origin groups, Mexicans have been incredibly strong
in exing their own political muscles. Rapid yet ongoing immigration from Mexico in-
creases the accessibility of Mexican identity in Los Angeles. However, largely overlooked
is whether non-Mexican Latino groups such as Guatemalans and Salvadorans are included
within this paradigm. Jim enez (2010) does not elaborate at length about the experiences
104of non-Mexicans in a city experiencing on-going Mexican immigration. My results suggest
that political messages about immigration, whether dened collectively or around Mexican
interests, do not resonate among non-Mexicans as they do for Mexicans in Los Angeles.
More research is needed to uncover when panethnicity becomes salient for non-Mexicans at
dierent thresholds of demographic strength across geographic contexts.
The results also show that the expression of Mexican identity is rooted in shared ex-
periences of economic disadvantage. Mexican Americans with higher perceptions of shared
economic interests with other Mexicans are less likely to vote for Representative Nicholas
Wilson when exposed to an immigrant political message about decreasing Mexican immigra-
tion. Evidence based on national statistics from the U.S. Census show that these perceptions
reect patterns of \real" economic disadvantage. Mexican Americans, like other Latino na-
tional origin groups, have persistently low socioeconomic status even by third generation
(Telles and Ortiz 2008). Models of European assimilation suggest that the children of immi-
grants made impressive gains over their parents in education, income, and occupation. We
do not observe these patterns for Mexican Americans. Mexicans have experienced disadvan-
tage on major indices of education, income, and poverty relative to other major racial and
ethnic groups since the 1970s (Telles and Ortiz 2008).
Conclusion
These results have implications on the future incorporation of Latinos on a national po-
litical stage. I nd that some anti-immigrant political messages resonate most with Mexicans
than non-Mexicans. Given increased media attention linking Mexican immigrants to debates
about immigration, Latino candidates and activists should not assume that issues of immi-
gration are sucient to mobilize all segments of the Latino population. For group-based
mobilization to occur on a national political stage, leaders need to be strategic about how
they connect experiences of non-Mexicans and Mexicans on policies related to immigration.
105Latino leaders will be most successful building coalitions across dierent national origin
groups through political messages emphasizing shared experiences of economic exclusion.
Mexican individuals with higher perceptions of shared economic interests with Mexicans
are signicantly less likely to support a candidate promoting an anti-immigrant political
agenda. These perceptions are situated in the economic realities of Latino lives throughout
the United States. Mexican Americans, like Puerto Ricans and other national origin groups,
have persistently low socio-economic status beyond the second and third generation. Given
that the U.S. political system rewards those groups with a strong, palpable presence and a
set of well-articulated interests, the extent to which elected ocials and organizations can
elicit shared economic interests on a national stage is likely to bring symbolic and material
rewards to the political incorporation of Mexicans.
106{Conclusion{
Electoral Strategy, the Immigration Debate, and Latino Politics
in the 21st Century
\We really look like Republicans on paper, but they dont want usThe Democrats dont look
like us on paper, but they really want us"
- Rev. Samuel Rodriguez, President of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership
Conference, Scherer, Time Magazine, 2012
On April 23, 2010, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona signed the harshest law in US im-
migration history, SB 1070. The new law aims to identify, prosecute, and deport illegal
immigrants. While some countries, including France have already mandated such laws, Ari-
zona is the rst state to demand that immigrants carry identity documents legitimizing their
presence on American soil (Archibold, New York Times, April 23, 2010). The enactment of
SB 1070 sparked a urry of protests across Arizona and nationwide. From coast to coast
in several cities, Hispanics rallied against the law calling it a recipe for racial and ethnic
proling.
While the passage of SB 1070 has mobilized thousands of Latinos to protest, the debate
over immigration has created conict within political parties and the American public on
how best to curtail illegal immigration. Governor Brewer and several other elected leaders
have come under intense political pressure by constituents enraged by the killing of a White
rancher in southern Arizona by a suspected smuggler weeks before the State legislature voted
on the bill. Governor Brewer invoked such stories of this ranchers death as she urged the
federal government to post National Guard troops at the border.
The debate over immigration highlights two contentious dynamics in American politics
an increasing Latino population and public discontent over illegal immigration. These two
dynamics have divided candidates and political parties in their attempts to maintain existing
political coalitions and garner votes from new emerging demographic groups. While many
speculate that the immigration issue mobilizes Hispanics to the polls, immigration reform
107also has consequences on the mobilization of Anglo voters. These trends have often resulted
in divergent political strategies from elites, exclusionary and inclusive, explicit and implicit,
on issues of immigration reform, leading many academics and political pundits to dene
Latinos as Americas top swing voters (Scherer, Time Magazine, 2012).
Since 1992, Republicans have won, on average, 30 percent, of the Latino vote, while
Democrats have won, at minimum, at least 53 percent between 1992 and 2008 (Lopez 2008,
Pew Hispanic Center; Passell, Fry, and Suro 2005; Abrajano, Alvarez, Nagler 2008). Cuban
Americans in Florida mainly account for the proportion of Latinos within the Republican
Party. Many scholars and journalists contend that the remaining 25% of the Latino vote
is up for grabs, a trend that has not gone unnoticed by both political parties (Scherer,
Times Magazine, 2012; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006). While the number of Spanish-
speaking political advertisements aired in battleground media markets has increased in the
past decade (DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006), substantive political incorporation has
not been achieved for Latinos. In fact, on the issue of immigration, both political parties
have been divided on how best to appease the anti-immigration wings of the party while
capturing the Latino vote.
During the 2008 campaign, President Obama emphasized how Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform will be one of his main priorities during the rst year of his administration
(Vega 2012). However, the Obama administration pushed for health care reform and global-
warming bills. During these past 4 years, he has also presided in a time of dramatic increases
in deportations. In response to critics over this issue, Obama commented he could not use
executive orders to suspend deportations citing that it \would not conform with [his] ap-
propriate role as president" (Obama speech, town hall meeting organized by Univision TV
network, 2011). The statement has been received with anger and frustration by many Lati-
nos who voted heavily for Obama in 2008 (67%).
The Republican Party has mainly been on the oensive in the immigration debate, em-
108ploying a number of anti-immigrant appeals, both direct and indirect, attacking Latino
and/or Mexican immigrants. The 2012 Republican primary is the most recent of these
larger, historical trends. In October 2011, Herman Cain drew loud cheers from crowds at
two rallies in Tennessee calling for an electried fence along the Mexican border. Speaking
to a rally sponsored by the Roane County Tea Party, he explains the details of his plan:
\Its going to be 20 feet high. Its going to have barbed wire on the top. Its going to
be electried. And theres going to be a sign on the other side saying, It will kill you
Warning [...] written in English and in Spanish" (Wyatt, New York Times, October
2011).
Contender Mitt Romney also won support from several states such as South Carolina
for his opposition to in-state tuition breaks for the undocumented, advocating: \you put in
place a magnet to draw illegals into the state, which is giving 100 thousand of tuition credit
to illegals that come into this country"(Hungton Post, October 18, 2011).
Public opinion polls among Latinos show a decline in Republican support. In a survey
for the Spanish-language network Univision, Matt Barreto found that just 20% of Latinos
perceived Republicans were hostile. In January 2012, 27% of Latinos felt Republicans were
hostile to Hispanics, with an additional 45% agreeing the Republicans care little about
Latinos as a group. Moreover, a total of 72% contend they do not feel welcome by the
Republican Party (Scherer, Time Magazine, 2012, quoted from Barreto 2012).
These trends in Latino have urged many Republican Party leaders to speak out against
the rise in anti-immigrant political rhetoric by Republican candidates. Ed Gillespie, former
Chairman of the Republican Party, speaking to a gathering of conservative Latinos, noted,
\In 2020 if the Republican nominee for President gets the same percentage of the white,
Hispanic, African American and Asian vote that John McCain got in 2008, a Democrat will
be elected to the White House by 14 percentage points (Scherer, Time Magazine, 2012)."
Other leaders such as former governor Jeb Bush and political strategist Karl Rove have also
urged the Party to opt for a more moderate tone in debates about immigration.
109Understanding Latino Voters - A New Approach
The preceding discussion sheds light on two assumptions in Democrat and Republican
strategies to garner Latino votes: rst, many conceive of Latinos as a monolithic group
without any consideration of group heterogeneity. Second, there is a belief that immigration
creates shared identities that mobilize all Latino voters as a cohesive voting bloc in American
politics. These assumptions lead to two trajectories in political strategy for Democrats and
Republicans. For Democrats the key to winning the Latino vote is for Obama to explic-
itly support and implement Comprehensive Immigration Reform. For Republicans the ideal
strategy is to appeal to conservative Latino voters on other salient issues such as abortion
or gay rights while pursuing a more moderate tone on immigration (Scherer, May 9, 2012).
While these political strategies are important in the short-term, the results from the es-
says in this dissertation suggests a more nuanced approach that takes into account the uidity
and complexity of Latino identity in America. Latinos share a common language, heritage,
culture, and immigration experience. At dierent political moments such as a \Latino on
the ballot," these shared characteristics serve as an important heuristic in making shared
ethnicity salient to Latino voters (Barreto 2007; McConnaughy, White, Casellas, and Leal
2010). However, the ndings from this compilation of essays raise an important caution-
ary note about the salience of identity across dierent national origin groups in response
to anti-immigrant political rhetoric. \Latino" identity is not only contextual, but is also
socially constructed (Bedolla 2005). The category Latino can have very dierent meanings
in one context versus another and can be expressed dierently in politics depending upon
an individual's national origin and geography.
The survey evidence from essay one suggests that Mexicans do not express strong attach-
ments to the pan-ethnic identier Latino whereas non-Mexican groups such as Dominicans
and Salvadorans have a stronger tendency to express such attachments. The experimental
evidence from essays two and three illustrate dierences between non-Mexican Latino groups
110and Mexicans in the political expression of identity in the context of threat. Among non-
Mexicans in New York City, we observe that pan-ethnic appeals in which Latinos are targeted
activate Latino identity in a decision not to support a political candidate. Conversely, among
Mexicans in Los Angeles, we nd that pan-ethnic appeals do not activate Latino identity.
Nationality-based appeals in which Mexicans are attacked increase the salience of Mexican
group interests in decreased candidate support.
The results illustrate the conditions under which pan-ethnic and national origin consid-
erations become salient in politics. Pan-ethnic identities may become more accessible in
cities where Latinos from multiple national origin groups live in close proximity and share
common political experiences. New York City may be exceptional in this regard relative to
other Southwestern cities. Its immigrant population is diverse. Unlike Los Angeles where
Mexicans dominate, no one group dominates the ow of immigrants (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf,
Waters, and Holdaway 2008). While Puerto Ricans constitute 32.9% of New York Citys His-
panic population, their numbers have declined in the past decade. Dominicans, Mexicans,
Ecuadorians, and Colombians have transformed the urban landscape. In 2009, Puerto Ricans
represented 32.9%, Dominicans 24.9%, Mexicans 13.5%, Ecuadorians 8.9%, and Colombians
4.9% of all New York City Latinos, creating various opportunities for intergroup contact
(Latino Data Project, Report 43, 2011).
Given that no one group dominates the political arena, non-Mexican groups in this par-
ticular context may nd pan-ethnic identity meaningful to mobilize upon in the achievement
of political power. This does not suggest that Spanish-speaking groups do not pursue courses
of action in the interests of their individual national origin groups as Mexican Americans,
Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, or others. I posit that the political context plays an
important role in the activation of shared Latino ethnicity in political decision-making. For
group-mobilization to occur in among non-Mexicans in New York City, Latinos must per-
ceive what Wendy Brown denes as \shared injury" (Brown 1995, 27-28). In contexts where
111Latinos were exposed to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals, non-Mexicans with stronger
perceptions of shared political linked fate were less likely to support the candidate. That
sense of \shared attacked" or \shared injury" motivated them to act on behalf of the collec-
tive group.
However, pan-ethnic considerations may not be accessible in geographic contexts where a
national origin group is sucient in numbers to mobilize eectively on its own. Historically,
Mexican political inuence has not depended upon the activation of pan-ethnicity. Mexi-
cans have been incredibly strong in exing their own political muscles without coalescing
with other Latino groups given their exceptional size due to high fertility and immigration
rates (Hero 1992; Segura and Rodrigues 2006; Jim enez 2010). Again, this does not suggest
that other groups in Los Angeles such as Guatemalans and Salvadorans are politically non-
existent within these geographic spaces, but they have not reached a sucient threshold to
make pan-ethnically politically meaningful or salient in Los Angeles.
Thus, to understand how a particular message resonates among Latinos or whether it
mobilizes or demobilizes collective identity in Latino political decision-making requires a con-
sideration of national origin membership and local context. The ways in identity is activated
by anti-immigrant political messages may dier for a 65 year-old Puerto Rican residing in
New York City than a recently naturalized Mexican in Los Angeles. The Democratic Party
has started to take account of these dierences to mobilize Latino voters in Florida and the
Southwest in recent campaign ads. Last year, in promoting President Obama's jobs plan,
they hired two actors in Spanish-language TV ads: a South American to read the script in
Florida and a Mexican for Nevada and Colorado (Scherer, Time Magazine, 2012).
New Directions in Research
We also need to disentangle eects of campaign political messages across generations.
The ndings in essay one provides suggestive evidence that varying levels of acculturation
112can play an important role in how Latinos identify. While modest, there is a strong rela-
tionship between English prociency and American identication. While not explored in
the experiments of this dissertation given sample size concerns, future research needs to
investigate the eect of political messages, anti-and-pro-immigrant, across dierent genera-
tions. Anti-immigrant messages may resonate strongly among recent immigrants, activating
shared political identities in a decision to protest or vote against a political candidate. We
may nd evidence of de-mobilization among later generation Hispanics, particularly among
older Cuban Americans in Florida who very strongly support the Republican Party.
The ndings presented also have important methodological considerations for future re-
search on Latino identity. I have examined four measures of collective identity identication,
linked fate, economic and political commonality. While this work challenges prior research
that solely focuses on linked fate in extensions to Latino politics, we need better measures
of identity, particularly when we examine immigrant based groups. For empirical simplicity,
I asked respondents to choose the national origin in which most of their family originates.
However, this approached is also hampered by selection issues since some families are not
solely dened by one country of origin. Some individuals may have a parent who is of
Colombian descent and another who is Puerto Rican, how does one classify him or herself in
nationalistic terms? Moreover, a growing number of second generation immigrants identify
by hyphenated identities, national origin and American identity. For example, Telles and
Ortiz show a dramatic increase in identication as Mexican American among second gener-
ation respondents (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Instead of avoiding these complexities in group
membership, future research should include measures that allow individuals to express mul-
tiple group memberships. National origin, pan-ethnic, and American identity are not xed
categories; they are the relational and may interact at times in the decision-making process.
In addition, this study highlights the need for more research on the eects of context on
Latino political attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation, we observe dierences in the
113activation of collective identity in politics among non-Mexicans and Mexicans in New York
City and Los Angeles. This study could benet dramatically by incorporating the experi-
ences of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans in Chicago or even more important Cubans in Florida,
who express strong attachments to the Republican Party than any other Latino national
origin group in the United States. This study provides initial insight that there is a strong
connection in how Latino identity is understood and expressed in dierent contexts. To un-
derstand this trend more accurately, models of Latino political behavior need to incorporate
more contextual measures in future research.
Lastly, the story of immigration politics in the United States as described in the begin-
ning of this paper is not a story solely conned to Latinos or Mexican immigrants. In fact,
political parties and candidates are caught in a dance of how best to capture the Latino vote
while appeasing the anti-immigrant wings of their respective parties. If a substantial number
of the party's base opposes immigration or policies that seek to incorporate undocumented
immigrants, how do you appease this group while also winning the Latino vote? This disser-
tation discusses the intricacies of Latino identity and the implications it has on this larger
question. However, a missing piece is how we understand the eect of explicit and implicit
immigrant political messages on Anglo voters who comprise a substantial majority of this
anti-immigrant sect of both political parties, particularly within the Republican Party.
McConnaughy, White, Leal, and Casellas (2010) have examined the eect of explicit
ethnic cues on the political opinions and choices of both Latinos and Anglo. In the domain
of Anglo voters, they nd that explicit cues primed negative sentiments about immigrants
as well as attitudes of national pride and patriotism. However, left unresolved is the dis-
tinction between pan-ethnic and nationality-based appeals or explicit and implicit ethnic
appeals in shaping the considerations White Americans bring to bear in their decisions to
support political candidates on issues related to immigration. Decisions to employ explicit
or implicit appeals targeting Mexican immigrants might also be related to context. For ex-
114ample, in states such as California or Nevada, implicit appeals might be highly eective in
priming negative attitudes toward immigrants since Mexicans constitute the largest group
of immigrants in these respective states. There is less of need to be explicit about the group
in question since most residents know that Mexicans comprise the largest Latino group in
these respective states. On the other hand, states such as Alabama might employ more
explicit appeals given the relative size of Latinos within these contexts. More research is
needed to uncover the eects of explicit and implicit appeals on White Americans political
decision-making in immigration politics.
Overall, despite these limitations, the evidence in this dissertation is suggestive that the
process by which identity is activated varies among non-Mexican Latino groups and Mexi-
cans. The political expression of pan-ethnic and nationalistic identities is likely to dier for
each group depending upon the nature and context of threat. With respect to this observa-
tion, the lessons from this dissertation are clear that we take seriously Latino heterogeneity
in American politics. If we are to discern the contours of Latino political incorporation in
the 21st century and beyond, we must listen to how Latinos across dierent national origin
conceptualize their own identities. It is here that we understand the power of political mes-
sages in making these identities salient or not in American politics. For if the advancement
of collective group interests is vulnerable to the political appeals in the environment, the
future incorporation of Latinos as a unied group at the national level may equally vulner-
able. Given the importance of collective mobilization to the promotion and advancement
of minority interests in a majoritarian political system, this dissertation sheds explanatory
light on the uid and complex nature of Latino identity(ies) and its consequences to the
future incorporation of Latinos in the United States.
115Appendix A
Percentage of Latinos Perceiving \a lot" of Linked Fate, Economic, and
Political Commonality by Generation
Table A.1: Pan-ethnic Group Attachments by Generation
National Origin Linked Fate Latino Linked Fate
All Latinos 50.09% 42.66%
First Generation 55.37% 48.77%
Second Generation 38.12% 29.00%
Third Generation 36.50% 25.37%
Fourth Generation 28.41% 25.81%
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Table A.2: Perceived Economic Commonality by Generation
National Origin Latinos
All Latinos 45.51% 38.02%
First Generation 47.60% 39.38%
Second Generation 43.88% 35.22%
Third Generation 36.52% 32.83%
Fourth Generation 29.12% 35.83%
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
116Table A.3: Perceived Political Commonality by Generation
National Origin Latinos
All Latinos 33.26% 24.32%
First Generation 33.36% 24.08%
Second Generation 34.78% 25.63%
Third Generation 31.27% 22.06%
Fourth Generation 27.62% 28.57%
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Table A.4: Of the three terms, Latino or Hispanic, national origin group, or
American group, which best describes you?
Latino/Hispanic National Origin American
All Latinos 37.8% 38.5% 17.1%
First Generation 40.7% 45.2% 7.6%
Second Generation 32.8% 30.2% 29.3%
Third Generation 31.7% 16.8% 46.0%
Fourth Generation 31.3% 17.0% 44.6%
Mexican 39.0% 38.9% 16.1%
Puerto Rican 27.4% 44.2% 21.7%
Cuban 26.7% 36.9% 27.6%
Dominican 39.1% 43.0% 10.2%
Salvadoran 48.2% 35.9% 9.3%
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
117Appendix B
Table B.1: Predicting Pan-ethnic Group Attachments by Generation
Coecient Standard Error
Discriminate -0.04 (0.06)
First Generation 0.53 * (0.21)
Second Generation 0.35 . (0.21)
Third Generation 0.26 (0.22)
English-Dominant -0.67 *** (0.08)
Time in US 0.05 (0.06)
Age -0.01 ** (0.01)
Education 0.07 *** (0.02)
Family Income -0.02 (0.02)
Female 0.20 ** (0.06)
Catholic 0.33 *** (0.07)
Mexican -0.01 (0.08)
Dominican 0.35 * (0.17)
Salvadoran 0.34 * (0.17)
Cuban -0.12 (0.16)
California 0.08 (0.09)
Intercept 11.74 *** (0.28)
N 5886
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Results are derived using OLS. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic
religion, foreign-born status, English prociency, time in the US, national origin group, and California
residence)
:p < 0:10, p < 0:05,   p < 0:01,   p < 0:001.
118Appendix C
Dependent Variables: Policy Measures
Immigration Policies23
Tuition: Undocumented immigrants attending college should be charged a higher tuition
rate at state colleges and universities, even if they grew up and graduated high-school in
the state.
Immersion: Replace multi-year bilingual instruction in schools with instruction in schools
with instruction only in English after one year
Immigration Policy: What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal
immigration?
(1) An eort to seal o the border to stop illegal immigration
(2) A guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the United States
(3) A guest worker program leading to legalization eventually
(4) Immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants
Non-Immigration Policies
Iraq: Keep U.S. military troops in Iraq as long as it takes to stabilize their government
Income Support: Government should provide income support to those who need it
Healthcare: The current health-care system needs government intervention to improve
access and reduce costs
Vouchers: Provide school vouchers to pay for a portion of the cost to send children to
private schools, even if that would take some money away from public schools
23All immigration policies are recoded such that strong opposition to each is scored higher on a scale from
1 to 4 with 4 indicating pro-immigrant opinions.
119Appendix D
Table D.1: Impact of Latino Identities on Immigrant Policies (Full Models)
Tuition Immersion Immigration
National Origin 0.06 *** (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.07 *** (0.01)
Pan-ethnic 0.03 *** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 ** (0.01)
American -0.15 *** (0.03) -0.11 ** (0.04) -0.12 *** (0.03)
Foreign-Born 0.21 *** (0.08) -0.27 ** (0.10) 0.50 *** (0.07)
English-Dominant -0.39 *** (0.08) -0.01 (0.10) -0.88 *** (0.07)
Time in US -0.06 (0.02) 0.01 (0.07) -0.11 (0.06)
Party -0.06 *** (0.02) -0.05 *** (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Age -0.01 *** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 *** (0.00)
Education 0.07 *** (0.02) 0.06 ** (0.02) -0.05 * (0.01)
Family Income 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 * (0.01)
Female 0.14 ** (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) 0.20 *** (0.05)
Catholic 0.01 (0.06) 0.07 (0.08) 0.10 (0.06)
Mexican 0.05 (0.07) -0.01 (0.09) 0.35 *** (0.07)
Dominican -0.08 (0.15) -0.07 (0.19) 0.18 (0.15)
Salvadoran -0.09 (0.14) -0.01 (0.19) 0.39 * (0.15)
Cuban -0.13 (0.14) 0.09 (0.20) -0.05 (0.14)
California 0.06 (0.08) -0.14 (0.10) 0.13 (0.08)
1|2 -2.10 *** (0.27) -1.27 *** (0.34) -2.52 *** (0.26)
2|3 -1.33 *** (0.26) -0.04 (0.34) -1.03 *** (0.25)
3|4 0.03 (0.26) 1.11 *** (0.34) 1.00 *** (0.26)
N 5335 2611 5186
Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.
Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender,
Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English prociency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan
identication (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.)
p < 0:05,   p < 0:01,   p < 0:001.
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